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Abstract 
 
Food waste consumes resources, has a negative effect on the environment and leads to monetary losses for the 
supply chain participants. One of the ways to address food waste is to reconsider the supply chain´s linear 
process and implement the reverse supply chain. Many researchers consider reverse supply chain to be 
sustainable and value adding. Yet some studies mention that in supplier-retailer interface in the context of food 
industries, reverse supply chains with take-back clause might be exposed to retailers’ market power abuse and 
cause overproduction and waste. This study used the qualitative approach to explore implications of power 
relations in retailer-supplier interface on take-back practice by looking at the case of Swedish bread suppliers. 
All major bread suppliers that have take-back agreement along with retailer chains, representing all retailer 
corporate ownership groups in Sweden have been interviewed. Using the theory of market power and reverse 
supply chain sustainability, the study analyzed the implications of power-relations on the take-back practice and 
explored sustainability concerns and/or fixtures it poses for the supply chain. The study findings do not fully 
confirm with conclusions of previous research arguing that reverse supply logistics systems serve as additional 
incentive for powerful retailers to over-order or lead to higher waste due to inability of suppliers to properly 
dispose of waste. Yet other instances of retailer’s market power that have not been touched upon in previous 
research were found within studied take-back agreement. The specific terms of agreement resulting from power 
asymmetries were found to still cause over-ordering and other negative effects on the overall sustainability of 
bread supply chains. The sustainability breaches identified in the study are mainly connected with lack of 
retailer’s economic incentive to reduce the amount of unsold bread, which becomes the source of 
overproduction, and leads to economic, environmental and social costs. 
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Glossary 
 
Asset recovery - the classification and disposition of returned goods, surplus, obsolete, scrap, waste and excess 
material products, and other assets, that maximizes returns to the owner, while minimizing costs and liabilities 
associated with the dispositions.  
 
Avoidable food waste - products that are still fit for human consumption at the time of being discarded or 
products that would have been edible if they had been eaten in time.  
 
Closed loop supply chain (CLSC) – is the process of embodying both forward supply chain and reverse supply 
chain during which the products are returned to the point of origin to enter the primary chain or diverted to a 
secondary market for the purpose recapturing value or proper disposal.  
 
Extended producer responsibility (EPR) - mandates take-back concept that requires producers/suppliers to 
arrange recycling or reuse of the products that are discarded or unsold.  
 
Lead-time - is the time between the order and delivery.  
 
Marketing returns - is a practice when the products are sent back from a retailer to the supplier due to closeout, 
seasonal return or surplus and overruns. 
 
Market Power – is when a firm with a substantial market power through influencing prices and other promotion 
activities may significantly alter partners' or rivals' sales and/or hurt their incomes 
 
Reverse supply chain (RSC) - is a process of moving products up along the supply chain for reasons such as 
consumer return, marketing return, asset returns, and etc.  
 
Take-back agreement/clause/practice – obliges producer to take care of the products that reached or are near 
the expiry date or are simply unsold and leftover for environmentally safe treatment.  
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Introduction  
 
Stockholm International Water Institute (SIWI) in year 2012 reported that around 1 billion 
people were suffering from hunger and malnourishment.   This number is steadily growing, 
although food production has been rising per capita (Jägerskog & Jønch Clausen, 2012; 
World Economic Forum, 2009). Global population is forecasted to increase by another 2 
billion of people by 2050, meaning more famine-stricken and greater resource scarcity 
(Sundström et al., 2014; Jägerskog & Jønch Clausen, 2012).   Paradoxically, the level of food 
waste is positively correlated with the level of harvest yields and food production. Increased 
food waste results in more food produced, hence utilization of more resources (Buzby & 
Hyman, 2012; Jägerskog & Jønch Clausen, 2012; Ingram, 2011). This implies that boosting 
the production is not the only and smartest course in achieving food security.      
 
Developed countries as compared to developing countries have abundance of food but they 
are also the biggest contributors to the food waste (Buzby & Hyman, 2012). While in 
developing countries the majority food loss and waste occurs on the post-harvesting stage 
(before food processing, packaging and markets) due to the poor storage, transport 
infrastructure, etc., in the developed world it is industries, retailers and consumers who are 
responsible for the largest share of wasted food (Buzby & Hyman, 2012; Jägerskog, 2012). 
Food wasting is thus not only economic, social and environmental, but also an ethical 
problem (Mena, 2011). Developed part of the world has an ethical obligation to cut its waste 
in later stages of supply chains, so the world wide demand for food does not inflate and the 
food can be allocated to less developed countries (Priefer et al., 2013). 
 
Current situation with escalating population, changing diets in developing countries (e.g. 
more diversified diets), environmental degradation, global warming and finiteness of 
resources puts bigger pressure on food producing companies and their supply chains 
(Schrettle et al., 2014). They are faced with challenges of efficiency and effectiveness, 
especially in development of adapted supply chain structures that help to address the problem 
of food waste generation and management (Ingram, 2011).  
 
One example of adapting the supply chain is creation of reverse supply chain (RSC), which 
involves taking back the products approaching the end of their life cycle or shelf life and 
arrange for their recycling or reuse (Atasu et al., 2009; Scarlett, 1999). Yet, this practice has 
proved to have contradicting implications in terms of its sustainability in particular contexts 
(Priefer et al., 2013; Buzby & Hyman, 2012; VCMC, 2012; DEFRA, 2007). Thus, there is a 
need to enrich the empirical knowledge by exploring the implications of this particular 
activity to shed the light on the sustainability concerns and/or fixtures it poses for a supply 
chain. 
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1.1 Problem background 
 
Food waste consumes resources, money, and time; it also negatively influences the 
environment (Eriksson, 2013; Bakas & Herczeg, 2010). It not only causes environmental 
problems, but it also leads to monetary losses for the supply chain participants and for the 
whole economy of a country. In fact, the further in the supply chain the bigger amount of 
waste is accumulated and the greater amount of money is squandered (Priefer et al., 2013). 
All this requires paying closer attention to the ways in which food wastage can be avoided at 
every stage of the supply chains.     
 
Generally, there are two main ways of addressing food waste: first is to tune product flow to 
avoid over-production hence food waste, and second – if the food waste has occurred anyway 
– to handle it in a beneficial manner (Strid et al., 2013). Most biogenic waste (food waste) is 
usually discarded to landfills, which produces hazardous greenhouse gases - methane and 
carbon dioxide (Ji et al., 2014; Mena et al., 2011; Monier et al., 2010). In the light of these 
environmental concerns food-producing companies are compelled to revisit their supply chain 
strategies and current food waste management practices to address the negative effects of 
land-filling (Jensen et al., 2013; Strid et al., 2013; VCMC, 2012).  
 
In the past sending the returned products to landfills mainly solved the problem of 
unsold/expired products, but the subsequently introduced regulations and tax raises on waste 
have changed this tendency (Rogers & Tibben-Lembke, 2001). The principal target of these 
environmental regulations was diminishing landfill space, preventing pollution, and shifting 
the responsibility from consumers to manufacturers (Rainey, 2006). Thus, they ushered the 
increasing importance of product’s end-of-life disposal (Rogers et al., 2010). Together with 
regulations and global environmental concerns, firms have been exposed to lots of other 
external and internal pressures. Consumer demand for more environmentally responsible 
practices, struggle to achieve economic value, company’s strategic and ethical endeavors, 
market power of other supply chain actors, etc. are among the drivers that have encouraged 
firms to consider sustainability issues in their supply chains (Schrettle et al., 2014; Jensen et 
al., 2013; Hasani et al., 2012; Rainey, 2006). These pressures are usually closely interrelated 
and often have conflicting nature, which poses dilemmas about introducing certain supply 
chain practices and assuring their sustainability (Presley et al., 2007).  
 
Broadly defined, sustainability builds on three major constituents – environment, society and 
economic performance, which are closely interrelated and together form a triple bottom line 
(Elkington, 1994). This notion suggests that a firm embarking on a sustainability track is 
ideally able to operate in a way that positively impacts society and environment, and 
simultaneously achieve long-term economic benefits (Carter & Rogers, 2008; Hart & 
Milstein, 2003). One of the ways to bring sustainability to supply chain is to reconsider the 
chain´s linear process and implement the cradle-to-cradle rather than cradle-to-grave 
philosophy. This philosophy presupposes forming a reverse supply chain that can be not only 
sustainable but also value-creating (Jensen et al., 2013; Lehr et al., 2013; Halldorsson et al., 
2009). The concept is also known as extended producer responsibility (EPR), which aims to 
internalize the externalities of the supply chain through designing the reversed supply chain 
(Ji et al., 2014; Lifset, 1993).  
 
The concept of reversed supply chain has been initiated to address various environmental, 
social and even economical issues by mandating take-back practice that requires 
producers/suppliers to arrange recycling or reuse of the products that are discarded or unsold 
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(Atasu et al., 2009; Scarlett, 1999). A company is free to choose how to design its reverse 
supply chain, which might determine its performance. Initially, the four major motivations for 
“extending” supplier responsibility were aimed at facilitating and improving recycling and 
recovery, influencing decisions on product design, creating new capabilities and achieving 
financial benefits (Lifset, 1993). Later the concept was developed to differentiate between 
different ways of achieving financial and environmental benefits through recreating value of 
returned products, i.e. using reverse supply chain designs as a source for improving the 
overall supply chain sustainability (Ji et al., 2014).  
 
Some suppliers of perishable products are especially concerned about creating more agile 
supply chains, i.e. more flexible, responsive and faster supply chains, that help to utilize 
emerging market opportunities, minimize waste, facilitate sustainable management of 
unsold/expired products, minimize the economical and environmental costs and enhance the 
overall sustainable performance of the supply chain (Kaipia et al., 2013; Hasani et al., 2012; 
VCMC, 2012; Gustavsson & Stage, 2011). The introduction of reverse logistics is described 
as one of the ways to help managing food surpluses that are becoming waste in more 
sustainable ways (Jensen et al., 2013; VCMC, 2012). At the disposal phase, reverse supply 
chain structure in this case needs to involve the combination of comprehensive take-back 
networks and environmental strategies for reusing, remanufacturing and recycling the 
returned products (Hasani et al., 2012). 
 
However, some researchers mention that reverse supply chains do not always bring 
sustainability to the whole supply chain, particularly, in the context of food industries and the 
retailer-supplier interface, when take-back agreement is used as contractual penalty of 
retailers enjoying dominant market power (Monier et al., 2010; Parfitt et al., 2010; DEFRA, 
2007). The producing company is in this case forced to perform the reverse logistics and 
might struggle with finding proper disposal channels (Rogers et al., 2010; DEFRA, 2007). 
Hence, returned products, instead of being properly reused and recycled, might end up in 
landfills (Stock & Mulki, 2009; Rogers & Tibben-Lembke, 2001).  
 
Moreover, studies from the food waste management sector such “Report of the Food Industry 
Sustainability Strategy Champions ' Group on Waste” (DEFRA, 2007) and “Cut Waste , 
GROW PROFIT ™” (2012) also argue that existing take-back provisions in contracts 
between retailers and suppliers might be translated into power abuse on the part of retailers. 
Product availability and variety is an important factor for retailers, so they are constantly 
trying to keep shelves well stocked, which often results in over-ordering (Strid et al., 2013; 
VCMC, 2012). Consequently take-back agreement can be considered as an additional 
incentive for the retailers to neglect proper demand forecasting, and stock the shelves with 
unnecessarily large product quantities, as they are often not responsible for managing the 
waste. That is why a good few studies focused on food waste see this agreement as the source 
of inadequate ordering and consequent over-production, hence financial losses for the 
producing companies and negative environmental consequences (Priefer et al., 2013; Buzby 
& Hyman, 2012; VCMC, 2012; Monier et al., 2010; Parfitt et al., 2010; DEFRA, 2007). All 
this raises concerns about the sustainability implications of take-back networks in particular 
contexts.  
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1.2 Problem 
 
Studies have shown that perishable food such as fresh bakery, fruits and vegetables contribute 
the most to the avoidable food waste (Kaipia et al., 2013; Gustavsson & Stage, 2011). On 
contrast to fresh fruits and vegetables, the logistics of bread in Sweden includes reverse 
supply chain with take-back practice. The biggest bread-producers supplying bakery products 
to retail stores in Sweden have a take-back agreement. According to this agreement bread 
suppliers take back all the bread that is approaching its best-before date and then dispose of it.  
 
Bread – belongs to the group of perishable products with a short shelf life. Both customer 
order lead-time and supply chain lead-time allowance are very short for this type of product. 
Moreover, supply chain for such products is often characterized by demand uncertainty, due 
to fast-changing customer preferences and customer demand for product variability (Kaipia et 
al., 2013).  
 
Shelf life, stock management, demand responsiveness and unsustainable management 
practices are considered to be the most frequent problems that lead to negative externalities in 
food supply chains (Kaipia et al., 2013). Highly variable demand and short shelf life of bread 
makes it harder to avoid the waste occurrence. Despite certain measures taken by producers in 
order to minimize waste, a particular amount of waste is unavoidable (Jensen et al., 2013). 
The supply chain actors’ main task in this case is to design sustainable supply chains that will 
serve the nature of products, prevent avoidable waste occurrences and ensure appropriate 
waste management (Kaipia et al., 2013). Managing the waste at the distribution stage rests 
with either supplier or retailer (Rogers & Tibben-Lembke, 2001).  
 
Discarding the bread that has passed its best before date may be money-draining since it 
involves activities such as storing, transporting the waste, renting containers and paying fees 
for discarding waste (Jensen, 2013; Kaipia et al., 2013; Gustavsson & Stage, 2011). 
Moreover, landfilling and incineration – the two most common ways of managing this type of 
waste – brings undesirable environmental consequences (Buzby & Hyman, 2012).  
 
Given the above mentioned problems and conflicting research findings about the reverse 
supply chains it is unclear what implications the reverse logistics networks of bread have on 
waste generation and management in supplier-retailer interface in Sweden, and how the take-
back practice impacts overall sustainability of the supply chain in question. Exploring this 
particular supply chain practice in a type of food that has biggest waste statistics is an 
effective way to address the food waste problem (Buzby & Hyman, 2012).  
 
Previous research presents incongruous findings with regards to potential sustainability 
concerns of the reverse logistics and is insufficient to suggest a proper description of take-
back practices of perishable food products in the supplier-retailer interface. Until recently 
most of the studies have largely focused on the food production element. The research 
exploring the stage of distribution and disposal, especially in supplier-retailer interaction, is 
very limited (Eriksson, 2013; Buzby & Hyman, 2012; Eriksson et al., 2012; Ingram, 2011; 
Lagerberg Fogelberg et al., 2011; Mena et al., 2011; DEFRA, 2007). Yet, supplier-retailer 
interface opens many opportunities to substantially minimize food waste. Studies have shown 
that the retailer-supplier interface has a high potential in reducing or eliminating food waste 
due to the big quantities of waste and costs of handling it in this stage (Jensen et al., 2013; 
Kaipia et al., 2013; Gustavsson & Stage, 2011). How the food is managed at this interface is 
particularly important for the overall sustainability of the supply chain, as it has already 
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passed all the value adding stages, have used the valuable resources, and have caused a certain 
environmental impact. So, examining one of the practices in this interface might provide 
relevant insights to the problem of food waste in general. 
 
The majority of existing research on supply chains emphasizes the importance of maximizing 
efficiency in the forward supply chain. Less attention has been paid to joint ability of forward 
and reverse supply chains to recapture and maximize value and reduce waste (Jensen et 
al.,2013; Defee et al., 2009). Moreover, most articles on reverse supply chain are dedicated to 
studying the reverse flow from consumers to suppliers, but few focus on supplier and retailer 
take-back logistics (Rogers & Tibben-Lembke, 2001). Also, the research on supply chain 
sustainability, and reverse supply chains in particular, until now have mostly focused on 
technological and automobile industries (Lehr et al., 2013; Demirbas, 2011; Atasu & Sarvary, 
2009; Locklear, 2000; Lifset, 1993). Hardly any research studied similar process in the 
context of perishable food products and bread in particular (Eriksson, 2012; Fogelberg et al., 
2011; Gustavsson & Stage, 2011). 
 
A particular practice might significantly affect all the other elements in the supply chain and 
may encourage better understanding of other root causes of food waste, as well as promote 
sustainable food waste management (Ingram, 2011). Buzby and Hyman (2012) highlighted 
that even a modest yet feasible initiative/fixture can ameliorate environmental, social and 
economical burdens. Reverse logistics with take-back clause is an example of a practice that 
can significantly affect all other elements of the supply chain, so studying this practice within 
particular context may shed light on the sustainability concerns and/or fixtures in a given 
supply chain (Priefer et al., 2013; Buzby & Hyman, 2012; VCMC, 2012; Monier et al., 2010; 
Parfitt et al., 2010; DEFRA, 2007). 
 
1.3 Aim 
 
The aim of this study is to explore the tack-back practice between Swedish bread suppliers 
and retailers. And more specifically, how this particular agreement and possible power 
asymmetries between suppliers and retailers may impact the overall sustainability of the 
supply chain. The goal is to answer the following questions: 
 
1. How is take-back practice carried out in the Swedish bread industry? 
2. What are the power-relations behind the take-back agreement between bread suppliers 
and retailers in Sweden? 
3. What implications does this take-back agreement and power-relations have in terms of 
bread supply chain’s sustainability? 
 
 
1.4. Delimitations 
 
The study is limited to exploring the take-back clause in supplier-retailer interrelation. Even 
though the study acknowledges the importance of other stages in supply chain and its other 
actors, they are not included in this study, since they are not taking active part in the studied 
process, i.e. take-back practice. 
 
The project is also geographically limited to Sweden, as the tack-back practice is well 
established in the country. Apart from that, there is a better possibility to contact the 
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companies and access the necessary empirical data since the researcher is based in Sweden 
and is familiar with the culture and language. 
 
There are also some delimitations connected to the research approach. Current research uses 
the qualitative approach, where data from interviews is self-reported and thus is limited in 
terms of independent verification and can contain potential sources of bias. To address this 
problem, the study used appropriate sample of participants that is big and varied enough to 
compensate for the possible lack of congruence. Moreover, secondary data sources were used 
to verify to the most possible extent that the data obtained during the interviews is bias-free. 
 
The paper explores the implications of take-back clause only in Swedish bread industry and 
involves studying the take-back clause between three major bread suppliers and nine 
representatives of major retailer chains in Sweden. The choice of companies and their 
representatives has been dependent on the willingness of the latter to participate in the study 
and by the timeframe of the project. The study focus dictated the choice of bread suppliers 
that have take-back agreement with retailers. Other bread suppliers represent an insignificant 
market share, do not have the take-back agreement and thus are believed to have limited 
ability to contribute with relevant insights to the study of take-back agreement. Moreover, 
only nine retailers from all chains have participated in the study, which also brought some 
limitations. The way the choice of participants have contributed to compensating for the 
limitations will be discussed in greater detail in Methodology section. 
 
Another source of limitation in this study is the access to statistical data on waste levels. The 
sensitivity of the subject made it hard to get hold of waste statistics and existing contracts in 
order to compare waste generation among participants and track any sign of market power 
exercise, as neither bread suppliers nor retailers were willing to disclose waste-related data or 
contractual terms. Yet, the general statistics on waste rates and sales is still used and believed 
to be sufficient to help drawing certain conclusions about the studied topic.  
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2 Literature review and theoretical perspective 
  
This chapter includes a literature review that provides a wider picture on the problem of food 
waste as an externality of unsustainable supply chain practices, the development of reverse 
supply chains and the possible implications of retailer power abuse in the context of reverse 
supply chains. It is followed by the description of theories used to analyze the findings and 
answer research questions.  
   
2.1 Literature review 
 
Literature review provides a general overview of a body of research, helps to determine where 
there are problems or contradictions in the existing research and place the research on a 
certain topic within a larger context (Knopf, 2006). Literature review is presented here to 
provide a wider portrayal of unsustainable supply chain practices that cause food waste, 
problems associated with waste management, as well as to clarify the concepts of take-back 
and reverse supply chain (RSC), i.e. closed loop supply chain (CLSC). It also helps to 
determine the contradictions of the existing research on the reverse logistics by providing 
some insights into how retailer market power can impact the sustainability of such supply 
chain design.  
 
2.1.1 Food waste – an externality of unsustainable supply chains 
       
Food waste is one of the externalities of unsustainable supply chain practices (Buzby & 
Hyman, 2012; Ingram, 2011). There are various definitions that can be found in the research 
on food waste. Bloom (2010 cited in Buzby & Hyman, 2012 p. 561), for instance, defines 
food waste as a subset of food loss which "...occurs when an edible item goes unconsumed as 
a result of human action or inaction and is often the result of a decision made from-farm-to-
fork by businesses, governments, and individual consumers". Priefer et al. (2013, p. 2), in 
turn, suggest that “food that was originally intended for human consumption, but is removed 
from the supply chain, is considered as food waste, even if it is brought to a non-food use”. 
Yet, this study is concerned with exploring if the bread suppliers can manage the returns to 
divert them from landfills and if the take-back clause leads to increase of unsold bread that 
can be avoided, so another definition of Priefer et al. (2013) i.e. the definition of avoidable 
food waste, would best serve the purposes of the study. The authors define avoidable food 
waste as “[…] products that are still fit for human consumption at the time of being discarded 
or products that would have been edible if they had been eaten in time” (Ibid.).  
 
Very often the occurrences of food waste are caused by supply chain inefficiencies. The 
tendency of supply chain actors to act in isolation, ignoring cooperation with other actors, 
poor communication, high fluctuations along value chain result in over-ordering and over-
production, which leads to growing amount of avoidable food waste (Kaipia et al., 2013; 
VCMC, 2012). The global food loss and waste in supply chains is estimated to be one third of 
all food produced, and wasted food amounts to 1.3 billions tons per year (Priefer, et al., 2013). 
This number is forecasted to increase by 40% by 2020 if no measures or actions are taken 
(Ibid.).   
 
One of the causes of food waste in developed countries is the tendency to satisfy the 
consumers’ whimsies and adjust the production accordingly. Customers become more and 
more picky and prefer to choose from a wide variety of products and from fully stocked 
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displays. So, even though the stores would not want to order more than they can sell from the 
supplier/manufacturer, they are more afraid of losing customers due to half-empty shelves. 
(VCMC, 2012; Priefer et al., 2013; Strid et al., 2013). Thus, a retailer is most often left with a 
certain amount of outdated food, which has to be disposed of. This food usually ends up in 
landfills, which has serious environmental effects, such as methane production by rotting 
organic matter and toxic gases that can negatively affect the air quality in a surrounding area 
(Skye, nd.).   
 
Sweden is one of the countries that has implemented methods of managing food waste and 
has cut the landfilling significantly. Less than 2% of total municipal solid waste in the country 
goes to landfills, the rest is treated through incineration, material recycling, composting and 
digestion (Priefer et al., 2013). Yet, the amount of avoidable food waste is still very high. 
According to Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (2010) wholesale/retail sector in 
Sweden generates more than 110 250 tons of avoidable food waste a year (Fogelberg et al. 
2011). It has also been calculated that if retailers and wholesalers could reduce their amount 
of food waste by 20%, they would have saved 121 millions of SEK (Fogelberg et al., 2011; 
Monier et al., 2010). All this points to the fact that in Sweden, as in any other country, there is 
an urge for a thorough analysis of food supply chains and development of food system 
adaptations in order to address food waste problem (Ingram, 2011).  
 
2.1.2 Development of take-back practice 
 
Given the urgency of the waste management within supply chains (SC), many countries have 
chosen to address the problem by imposing legislative obligations, which extend the suppliers 
responsibility for the product throughout the whole life cycle (Ji et al., 2014; Atasu, & 
Sarvary, 2009; Scarlett, 1999). These requirements have forced businesses to unveil the 
amount of waste they have been generating and to think of waste management methods 
(Rainey, 2006). In an attempt to decrease waste and improve waste management EU-member 
states and other countries like Japan and USA have introduced take-back regulations that 
require producer to handle the products at the end of their lifecycles in a sustainable manner 
(Ji et al., 2014; Atasu, & Sarvary, 2009; Scarlett, 1999).  
 
Therefore, it can be inferred that the move towards more sustainable value chains in Europe 
was partially stimulated by EU directive (Lehr et al., 2013). This directive in essence, impels 
producer to design for recyclability, or more specifically, as put by Scarlett (1999, p.4), "...[to] 
arrange for take back, recycle, or reuse (either directly, or indirectly by contracting with a 
third party) some of their products after they are discarded by consumers". One example of 
such legislative structure, or “take-back” obligation is WEEE (Waste Electric and Electronic 
Equipment) (Lehr et al., 2013; Rogers et al., 2010). Yet, all of the take-back obligations do 
not necessarily focus on after-consumption stage. Some of them oblige the producer to take 
care of the products that approach the expiry date, or are simply unsold and leftover, for 
environmentally safe treatment (Atasu et al. 2009). 
 
Unsurprisingly, at its inception the obligation to arrange for take-back and recycling was seen 
by companies as nothing but an additional costly activity (Hanifan & Hoyle, 2011; Stock & 
Mulki, 2009). However, after a while some managers started to realize its potential benefits 
such as cost efficiency and added value (Rainey, 2006). Now more and more studies confirm 
that new form of SCs, that include taking care of products at the disposal stage, can create 
value through minimization of various risks, including environmental, social and cost-related 
risks (Ji et al., 2014; Jensen et al., 2013; Lehr et al., 2013; Hanifan & Hoyle, 2011; 
Halldórsson et al., 2009; Carter & Rogers, 2008; Scarlett, 1999). It is also argued that 
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business strategies that pursue economic fortune can benefit from implementing waste-
reducing practices as one of the major elements of sustainable food SCs. This can be achieved 
by minimizing disposal costs, brushing up logistics and managerial activities. Moreover, the 
efforts to reduce food waste along the SCs can facilitate building positive associations with 
the brand (VCMC, 2012).  
 
Gradually, extending producer responsibility for their products, i.e. implementation of take-
back practices, has become an element of a more sustainable SC structures. One of the major 
focus in research on sustainable supply chain management (SSCM) is exploring the reverse 
and closed-loop supply chain designs (Jensen et al., 2013; Lehr et al., 2013; Hanifan & Hoyle, 
2011; Halldórsson et al., 2009; Scarlett, 1999). The reverse supply chain (RSC) with its 
indispensable part – the take-back agreement – is a part of a broader concept: the closed-loop 
supply chain (CLSC) (Jensen et al., 2013; Halldórsson et al., 2009; Guide, 2003).  
 
CLSC is the process embodying both forward and reverse SCs during which the products are 
returned to the point of origin to enter the primary chain or diverted to a secondary market for 
the purpose of recapturing value or proper disposal (Ibid.). It includes returns management, 
product acquisition, issues of remanufacturing and secondary markets, channel design and 
asset recovery. Asset recovery is argued to minimize costs and maximize profits of the 
company performing reverse logistics. 
 
Reverse logistics or RSC is a process of moving products up along the SC for reasons such as 
consumer return, marketing return, asset returns, and etc. (Defee et al., 2009). As Rogers and 
Tibben – Lembke (1999, p. 130) define it, RSC is "…the process of planning, implementing 
and controlling the efficient, cost effective flow of raw materials, in-process inventory, 
finished goods, and related information from the point of consumption to the point of origin 
for the purpose of recapturing or creating value or proper disposal". Depending on the nature 
of a product, re-seller policies and contextual differences, the product in the CLSC might not 
necessarily get back to the point of origin. It can alternatively be used as an input for the other 
SC(s). So, subject to different contexts, the RSCs activities vary in complexity and design 
(Jensen et al., 2013; Guide et al., 2003). At manufacture level waste has a potential to be 
transformed into other productive inputs, while at the distribution level food surpluses can be 
managed through various form of productive recycling, such as donation, anaerobic digestion, 
composting, redistribution extra food to animal feed or by producing energy from biomass 
(VCMC, 2012). 
 
To the contrast of organizations with traditional SC, closed-loop oriented organizations are 
not only concerned with issues of traditional SC, but also emphasize the strategic importance 
of RSC and its value (Defee et al., 2009). Asset recovery, diverting the products from landfills 
and value re-creation potential makes CLSC activities potentially profitable and overly 
beneficial for the supplier (Rogers et al., 2010).   
 
 
2.1.3 RSC and retailer’s market power  
 
Powerful retailers imposing take-back clause as a contractual penalty  
 
Taking the argument from the previous section further, it can be argued that the sustainability 
of the RSCs and product take-back systems depends on whether the strategies for product 
returns and corresponding SC designs are efficient enough (Rogers et al., 2010). Some 
literature maintains that take-back systems in supplier-retailer interface may be exposed to 
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retailers’ market power abuse and have certain implications on each of the sustainability 
pillars through, for example, causing overproduction and waste (Buzby & Hyman, 2012; 
DEFRA, 2007). 
 
Grocery retailers are increasingly playing a greater influencing and negotiating role, as they 
serve as an important and often the only link between consumers and producers (Tansey 
&Worsley, 1995). The structure of European food retailing market in particular raises big 
concerns, as their huge market shares and dominant position trigger the change in food market 
structures (Anders, 2008; Foffana & Jafrey, 2008). Large supermarkets are conquering the 
market share in the total retail sales, leaving smaller retailers overboard. These large retailers 
are turning into a powerful consolidated group of actors that play a significant role in 
changing the supply chain practices (Foffana & Jafrey, 2008).  
 
Some studies mention that reverse logistics might be imposed to the company by powerful 
retailers (Parfitt et al., 2010; DEFRA, 2007). The supplier is bound to take back the stock that 
has reached a specific amount of residual shelf life (or had already passed it) and dispose of it 
(Ibid.). The common form of take-back and reverse logistics in the supplier-retailer interface 
is marketing returns (take-back clause). This is a practice when the products are sent back 
from a retailer to the supplier due to closeout, seasonal return or surplus and overruns (Rogers 
et al., 2010). Usually big retailers, which possess the majority of market share and are 
attractive to suppliers, exercise their bargaining power through imposing hardly negotiable 
rules (Radaev, 2013; Peitz & Shin, 2012). Take-back agreement might be one of such rules. 
Sending the unwanted product back to the supplier is the most desirable option for the retailer, 
as it can help save on the disposal costs. Moreover, such agreement typically specifies that 
manufacturer should provide a full return of money for the unsold products to the retailer 
(Rogers et al., 2010; DEFRA, 2007).  
 
Consequently, a manufacturing company performing the reverse logistics operations (the 
take-back) is forced to deal with additional processes, such as transportation of the obsolete 
products back, remanufacturing (if required), finding proper disposal options or the 
appropriate secondary markets. And this is not always an easy nor an inexpensive task 
(Rogers et al., 2010; DEFRA, 2007). In some cases the disposal of the product should be 
carried out in a very short time, so that the remained value of the product, that can still be 
recovered, is put at use and is able to bring the company some profit. But many companies do 
not dedicate sufficient time for immediate reprocessing. Particularly when returned products 
are regarded as a costly failure, firms are likely to ignore them (Rogers & Tibben-Lembke, 
2001). Hence, value constantly declines the more time a product is left unprocessed (Ibid.). 
The quantity of returned products might be quite large, and just a portion of their value can be 
recovered, if any at all (Stock & Mulki, 2009). Otherwise, the company will have to deal with 
processing returns with little recoverable value, which entails additional costs rather than 
profits (Rogers et al., 2010).  
 
The reverse logistics for the supplier might be further complicated by the nature of the 
product, especially if the company wants to sell the returned products to the secondary 
markets. The pricing of the taken-back products are much more complex, depending on the 
characteristics of the product, its remaining value and quantities that are aimed to be sold to 
the secondary markets (Rogers & Tibben- Lembke, 2001). The manufacturer is the party who 
carries the full burden of responsibility and has to work out the most profitable ways of 
disposal. The way a company disposes of returned products can make a competitive 
difference, if it enables to reduce costs and raise revenues (Ibid) If such ways are not found, 
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the investments made (production, marketing, logistics) risk to fall behind the costs (Rogers 
& Tibben- Lembke, 2001; Rogers et al., 2010). 
 
Take-back clause as source of overproduction in the context of retailer market power 
 
Product availability and variety is an important factor for the retailer, and it represents a trade-
off between potential increase of unsold products and decrease in customers’ satisfaction 
(Strid et al., 2013, VCMC, 2012).  In general, the stores do not want to order more than they 
can sell, but are simultaneously afraid of losing customers due to half-empty shelves. Usually 
retailers in such scenarios opt for securing customer satisfaction, which often results in over-
ordering (a. a.). Thus, take-back arrangements may serve as additional incentive for the 
retailers to order an unnecessarily big supply of goods with little consideration for the actual 
demand, as they are not responsible for managing the waste. For that reason take-back 
agreement is seen by studies focused on food waste as the source of inadequate ordering, 
consequent over-production and waste accumulation (Buzby & Hyman, 2012; Parfitt et al., 
2010; Monier et al., 2010; DEFRA, 2007). In this case, the manufacturer/supplier who has 
invested in production, packaging, marketing and distribution receives no revenue on it, and 
only adds to the already snowballed costs (Rogers et al., 2010; Rogers & Tibben- Lembke, 
2001).  
 
Considering the effects of over-ordering, it is of a paramount importance to mention that 
overproduction not only leads to economic costs for the producing company, but also involves 
utilizing the resources, and impacting the environment by certain production processes 
(Eriksson, 2013; Bakas & Herczeg, 2010). All the environmental costs are also unjustified if 
the produce would finally be left unconsumed and become waste (Priefer, 2013). In supplier-
retailer interface, in the context of retailers’ market power, the efficiency of take-back systems 
is not guaranteed (Parfitt et al., 2010; DEFRA, 2007). Finding secondary markets or other 
proper disposal channels for the products, especially those with short shelf life, might be 
troublesome (Priefer et al., 2013; Buzby & Hyman, 2012; VCMC, 2012; Monier et al., 2010; 
Parfitt et al., 2010; DEFRA, 2007 ). Sometimes, the taken-back products are impossible to 
dispose of at all because of the legal or other restrictions. For instance, in Denmark, the 
legislation forbids to sell food products that have reached the “fresh until” date, although 
these products are still not obsolete and are suitable for consumption (Jensen et al., 2013). 
Some firms might be afraid of damaging their brand images when selling their products on 
secondary markets. Thus, a significant amount of goods that can otherwise be consumed 
without any risk for health or disposed of beneficially through other channels may end up in 
the landfills (DEFRA, 2007).  
 
Finding other channels for disposal, that do not presuppose at least some monetary 
compensation for the returned stock might not be even considered by the company, or can 
also be problematic to find (Stock & Mulki, 2009; Rogers & Tibben-Lembke, 2001). 
Arranging for proper recycling might involve further investments and changing many of the 
firm’s processes, which might be overwhelming for it. For that reason companies might 
decide to save themselves from those troubles, and returned products will eventually be 
turned to landfills (Stock & Mulki, 2009; Rogers & Tibben-Lembke, 2001).  
 
It might be inferred that so-called "salvage supply chain", i.e. RSC with take-back practices 
can bring benefits to the company and environment only if the latter has sufficient knowledge 
about the disposal ways and secondary markets. Implementing a reverse logistics may turn 
into environmental costs if the capabilities of the firm are inadequately weighed (Jack et al., 
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2010). Returned products may yield some value but it is critical that companies are able to 
dispose of and handle them adequately without the costs for itself and for environment 
(Rogers & Tibben-Lembke, 2001, Stock & Mulki, 2009). 
 
Bread, like most of the food, is very likely to end up being the biodegradable waste that is 
usually not fit for incineration – it has low heating values and thus is most often deposited to 
landfills (Priefer et al., 2013). This has serious environmental effects, as not all of the landfills 
have special equipment for collecting and utilizing methane emitted by biodegradable waste 
(Ibid.). Following these, it might be assumed that the lossmaking costs of managing waste or 
unjustified costs for overproduction, as well as inability to manage the waste appropriately 
will inevitably leave the society at disadvantage.  
 
2.2 Theoretical framework 
 
The theoretical framework for the analysis of the study has been developed drawing upon the 
existing literature on the RSCs in general and on take-back networks in supplier-retailer 
interface. This has been achieved using the guidance of Leedy and Ormond (2005), the 
analysis has been conducted through organization and categorization of relevant literature and 
identification of patterns, which helped to build the theoretical framework based on two major 
theories: retailers market power and sustainability of RSC.  
 
The literature review has shown that the field of reverse logistics in the context of supplier-
retailer interface and perishable products has not yet been examined sufficiently and the 
knowledge of the potential sustainability implications of such practices is lacking. Thus, the 
problem is considered to be rather novel and complex. Therefore, the study attempts to 
explore the tack-back practice between Swedish bread suppliers and retailers by investigating 
how this particular agreement and possible power asymmetries between suppliers and 
retailers may impact the overall sustainability of the supply chain. In order to fulfill the 
research aim, a theoretical framework consisting of two separate theories will be used. The 
theory of market power will be used to analyze the nature of power relations behind the take-
back practice and the means, if any, of market power manifestation.  
 
To further discuss the sustainability implications of the take-back agreement in the Swedish 
supplier-retailer interface, the concept of sustainable reverse supply chain will be used.  
The aspect of food waste as the externality of the unsustainable food SC is chosen as a focus, 
as it is assumed to incorporate in itself and account for all three constituents of sustainability. 
The economic aspect is reflected in the fact that decreasing the food waste would also mean 
preventing costs (both financial and environmental) of overproduction and waste 
management, and thus may significantly help a firm grow and generate profits. Environmental 
aspect is addressed as well, as managing the waste appropriately and decreasing its amount 
helps to minimize undesirable environmental consequences. Finally, the above-mentioned 
aspects, in turn, touch on a social aspect. Measures to reduce and manage waste can have a 
positive effect on life quality of the community as whole, and supply chain actors in 
particular, while preventing avoidable food waste is also a question of ethics and morality 
(Schrettle et al., 2014; Mena et al., 2011).  
  
2.2.1 Market power   
  
The literature review has revealed that sustainability of the RSC in the supplier-retailer 
interface can be subject to negative influence of certain power-relations. A theory that 
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provides the necessary conceptual tools to examine what power relations lie behind the take-
back practice in bread retailer-supplier interface in Sweden and if these relations impact the 
sustainability of the SC is the theory of market power, as it incorporates both the description 
of market power sources and the means of its manifestation. 
 
According to Brandow (1969, p. 2), "a firm may be said to possess market power if a price, 
production, marketing, or purchasing decision it might practically make can directly and 
materially affect the incomes of the firms or persons or can appreciably change the average 
price, total quantity, or marketing or purchasing practices in a market in which it 
participates". In other words, a firm with a substantial market power through influencing 
prices and other promotion activities may significantly alter partners' or rivals' sales and/or 
hurt their incomes. Brandow (1969) argues that market power will always exist, as the 
competition is rarely perfect, so it will only vary in its degree and scale. The degree of power 
a firm can possess varies greatly, depending on market conditions. One and the same firm can 
have varying market power in two different markets. Moreover, the power may appear to be 
short-term and long term, depending on the changing market environment and counter-efforts 
taken by the other players (Ibid).  
  
Brandow (1969), Li et al. (2006), Fofana and Jaffry (2008) have identified quite a few sources 
of market power, which are decisive in the degree and scale of market power. Such sources 
include the size of the firm, its geographical expansion within inter-related local market(s), 
firm’s diversification over products and new products introduction, structure and 
collaboration of buyers, elasticity of demand for the industry product, access to consumers, 
etc. The key sources of market power found in most of the relevant literature are summarized 
below. 
    
Firm size. The larger the firm, its financial resources and market share in the related local 
markets, the more power it has in affecting and modifying the production, promotion and 
general market situation for the other actors of the same market.  Such "weight" advantage of 
a firm helps it to better survive competitive battles and confidently adopt price setting without 
being opposed by weaker firms. Usually these are the firms operating in several 
interdependent local and regional markets (Brandow, 1969). Retail grocery chains, for 
example, have a big bargaining power as they are the dominant players for many commodities 
in many regional markets all over the world, and thus are in a position to exert a strong 
influence on suppliers (Li, et al., 2006).   
 
Diversification over products. By diversifying, i.e. producing a number of products, a firm 
decreases its dependence on any one product, thus reducing the risk of loosing the profit if 
something in the supply chain of this product goes wrong. Rivals in each market usually 
recognize the importance of diversification, yet particular firms are often able to diversify 
only to a certain extent, as diversity usually comes at the expanse of efficiency. Many 
scholars consider that food chain retailers are usually very successful at managing the balance 
between efficiency and diversification, and that is why may engage in market struggles 
without affecting the main source of their incomes (Brandow, 1969).  
 
Concentration. In the markets where only a small group of firms collectively own the largest 
proportion of the industry's market share, the power relations' context is modified. The firms 
are in this case strongly interdependent and not rarely decide to act as a conglomerate, 
adopting common pricing, marketing and other practices benefiting the whole group. If these 
firms are retailers, they might form an olygopsony, i.e. a concentration of only few large 
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buyers, and collaborate to create a single “front” (a wholesale buying group) to seller. As 
defined in Investopedia.com (2014), olygopsony is “a market in which there are only a few 
large buyers for a product or service,[which] allows the buyers to exert a great deal of control 
over the sellers,[…]dictate the price they pay to sellers and even to influence labor standards 
in the industry. The members of the olygopsony group would seek out only the best deals and 
terms of contract, and if such offers are not available – integrate into the supply industry by 
creating own brands (Brandow, 1969). Such olygopsony conditions are characteristic to 
European grocery retailers – the large retail chains in particular. Large buying power enables 
them to restrict the demand for goods at the upstream stage and erode perfectly competitive 
market conditions, usually by decreasing the suppliers gains or by boycotting some of 
suppliers at all and switching to new ones that provide a cheaper deal (Fofana & Jaffry, 
2008).  
 
Elasticity of demand for the industry's product.  Highly inelastic demand for the industry’s 
product represents a great opportunity to exercise market power for the oligopsony group. The 
rival firms, forming the oligopsony in a particular industry are encouraged to follow their 
mutual interest, long-term considerations and most importantly, maintaining prices at high 
level, if the demand for the industry’s product is not elastic enough (Brandow, 1969). Highly 
inelastic demand in the industry where the product is also highly perishable creates an even 
greater imbalance of bargaining power and makes it easier for the oligopsony group to abuse 
their market power (Li, et al., 2006).  
 
Access to consumers. Promotion is the main means of successful product differentiation and 
in some industries (e.g. food industry) it strongly depends on the resources and skills used to 
promote the product at places where the consumers shop. The shift from private label 
stores  (home dairy delivery, local bakeries, butcher shops, etc.) to food retailers leads to the 
increasing market power of retailers that represent the best, and sometimes the only access 
channel to consumers 1(Walden, 1990, Brandow, 1969). Consumers incur transaction costs 
when travelling from one geographical area to the other. So a firm that is represented evenly 
around a certain market/region will have the advantage in the access to consumers. The spatial 
distribution and close proximity of grocery stores to living neighborhoods, for instance, gives 
them a quite significant incentive to exercise market power (Li, et al., 2006).  
 
Analyzing the presence of market power sources described above, one can detect whether and 
to what extent a particular firm can affect prices, marketing, procurement and other market 
practices in the industry. Yet, the means through which market power is exercised are 
numerous and sometimes not readily apparent. Li, et al. (2006, p. 223), for instance, state "the 
retailer oligopsony [market] power is difficult to investigate empirically, because prices paid 
by retailers to shippers or manufacturers are typically not revealed". A grocery chain can 
show its power by undertaking the production of a private label product or by forcing 
manufacturers to engage in unfavorable exchange arrangements (Brandow, 1969). 
Sometimes, the market power is not even manifested in the greater profit objectives of the 
firm, but rather in bringing changes to supply chain, distribution channels and other actor’s 
services. The bottom line is that whether through affecting the pricing, promotion, supply 
chain structure or any other market-wide practices the firm possessing market power can 
materially affect other market participants (Brandow, 1969). 
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2.2.2 Sustainable RSC 
 
The market power theory provides a guidance for analyzing the power relations between 
Swedish bread suppliers and retailers and the means, if any, of market power abuse. However, 
this theory alone is unable to offer a toolbox for examining the possible impact of the existing 
power relations and the take-back clause agreement on overall sustainability of the supply 
chain in question. So, to further analyze the findings on take-back logistics in a more holistic 
manner, the concept of sustainability’s triple bottom line within the RSC will be used as a 
framework.  
 
Sustainability promoting triple bottom line principle has become one of the fundamental 
principles of smart management (Rainey, 2006; Mark-Herbet, 2010). Shrivastava (1995, cited 
in Carter & Rogers 2008 p. 363) defines sustainability as “the potential for reducing long-
term risks associated with resource depletion, fluctuations in energy costs, product liabilities, 
and pollution and waste management”. Sustainable supply chain management is thus 
achieved through adaptation of company’s business processes and practices with the aim to 
achieve social, environmental goals while improving long-term economic performance of the 
company and its supply chains (Carter & Rogers, 2008). Carter& Rogers (2008, p. 368) 
define sustainable supply chain management (SSCM) as follows: "SSCM [is] the strategic, 
transparent integration and achievement of an organization’s social, environmental, and 
economic goals in the systemic coordination of key inter-organizational business processes 
for improving the long-term economic performance of the individual company and its supply 
chains". 
 
Very often the pillars of the sustainability, especially in the context of SC management, are 
closely interrelated, and are difficult to analyze separately (Mark-Herbert, 2010; Rainey, 
2006). So the potential opportunities behind triple bottom line principles are usually analyzed 
to assess if certain SC practices are able to improve a SC’s sustainable value and decrease 
operational and environmental costs and impact (Ji et al., 2014).  
 
As mentioned earlier, research exploring SSCM among other concepts focuses on the concept 
of RSC (Jensen et al., 2013; Lehr et al., 2013; Hanifan & Hoyle, 2011). The RSC is 
concerned with returning the products to recover their value (either fully or partially) ( Rogers 
et al., 2010; Halldórsson et al., 2009; Guide, 2003). Efficient strategies for product returns and 
corresponding SC designs arguably enhance the firm’s competitive advantage and improve 
the environmental and societal profile of the company (Lehr et al., 2013; Hanifann & Hoyle, 
2011; Stock & Mulki, 2009). 
 
RSC designs with take-back clause are described in many studies as one of the constituent 
components of sustainable supply chain (Halldórsson et al., 2009; Stock & Mulki, 2009; 
Carter & Rogers, 2008; Scarlett, 1999). Defee et al. (2009) argue that companies that 
recognize the potential advantages of RSCs implement the new intra-organizational strategy, 
presupposing integration of reverse and forward flows in the CLSC. Such SC designs have 
certain sustainable implications as they are designed to reduce waste by recovering the value 
of the taken-back products (Munksgaard & Arlbjørn, 2013; Stock & Mulki, 2009; Scarlett, 
1999).  
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The main characteristics of sustainable RSCs is that all SC actors are expected to enjoy the 
triple bottom line benefits - better economy, ecology and better social conditions (see figure 
1) (Halldórsson et al., 2009). Each of these constituents of the sustainable RSC are discussed 
below.   
 
 
1) Economic sustainability of RSC 
 
First sustainability dimension – economic – in the context of the reverse logistics presupposes 
long-term success and competitiveness of a company, achieved through the efficient use of 
and direct benefits from recovery actions (Winter & Knemeyer, 2013; Presley et al., 2007). 
Economic dimension of the sustainable take-back practice is reflected in the ability of the 
company to use the reverse logistics to help cutting costs of environmentally undesirable 
disposal and maximizing profits by recovering the value of the returned products. Rogers  
et  al. (2010, p. 139) defines this as “asset recovery”, i.e. “the classification and disposition of 
returned goods, surplus, obsolete, scrap, waste and excess material products, and other 
assets, that maximizes returns to the owner, while minimizing costs and liabilities associated 
with the dispositions". The RSC activities are thus argued to be potentially profitable and 
overly beneficial for the supplier/manufacturer. It is also believed that these benefits can be 
spread across the whole SC, involving other actors and making the company even more 
effective at cutting costs and gaining a competitive position (Winter & Knemeyer, 2013; 
Defee et al., 2009; Hicks et al., 2004). 
 
Strategies for reverse chain designs are eventually chosen based on the potential of economic 
value recovery of waste (Ji et al., 2014). According to Rogers et al. (2010, p.137), "the 
decision to put additional effort into reclaiming the product depends on the cost of 
refurbishing versus the cost of throwing it away". All the sustainability initiatives are 
considered with respect to economical aspects i.e. there is always a tradeoff between costs and 
benefits (Ji et al., 2014). The costs of disposing the products to landfills, both financial and 
environmental, should serve a good encouragement to arrange for asset recovery in RSCs 
(Rogers et al., 2010). Plus, getting extended use of an asset and avoiding it going to landfills 
is generally considered to be sustainable (Ji et al., 2014). The way a company disposes of 
Figure 1: Illustration of the triple bottom line (with inspirations from Mark-Herbert, 
Rotter & Pakseresht, 2010). 
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returned products can make a competitive difference, if it enables to reduce costs and raise 
revenues (Ibid.). If it does, the reverse chain can be turned from the unpleasant obligation to a 
source of value, especially, if such practice is one of the firm's distinctive capabilities 
(Schrettle et al., 2014; Defee et al., 2009; Halldórsson et al., 2009; Lifset, 1993).  
 
2) Environmental sustainability of RSC 
 
The next sustainability facet – environmental – in SC management implies including 
mechanisms and networks that promote greater environmental responsibility (Winter & 
Knemeyer, 2013) Reverse logistics, from this perspective, should implement environmentally 
sound practices such as recycling, remanufacturing and reclamation. Presley et al. (2007, 
p.4607), maintains, “the basic principle is that lengthening of a product’s or material’s life 
typically has environmental benefits”. In the context of this study the environmental 
dimension is mainly addressed by discussing the way RSCs and take-back agreements 
minimize the undesirable environmental consequences of landfilling by reusing and recycling 
the waste.  
 
Production of a good requires a range of resource inputs including one of the scarcest – water 
(Jägerskog & Jønch Clausen, 2012). It does not matter whether the produce was consumed, 
lost or wasted; it has already utilized water, energy, land and emitted greenhouse gases (Ibid.). 
That is why a greater emphasis is put into creating agile supply chains that would facilitate 
waste reduction at all stages of supply chain, including the disposal of unsold food items.  
 
Most of the unsold obsolete food ends up being the biodegradable waste that is usually not fit 
for incineration as it has low heating values and thus is most often deposited to landfills. This 
has serious environmental effects, as not all of the landfills have special equipment for 
collecting and utilizing methane emitted by biodegradable waste (Priefer et al., 2013). Thus, 
the implementation of more sustainable waste management techniques, such as recycling, 
reuse and other methods that prevent food waste from landfilling will contribute to improving 
environmental sustainability of supply chain. RSC diverts the unsold items from landfills 
through recycling or redistributing them to secondary markets. By doing so it reduces the 
product's ecological impact through reducing waste (Rogers, et al., 2010). This way, the take-
back networks are able to generate cash and recover the economic and environmental value 
(to the most possible extent) through recovering the value of products that risk to end up in 
landfills. These networks are increasingly seen as very important part of companies' business 
activities (Ibid).  
 
3) Social sustainability of RSC 
 
According to Winter and Knemeyer (2013, p. 4607) “the social dimension [of sustainability] 
is bipolar; it refers both to individuals and organizational levels”. When discussing the social 
dimension in reverse logistics it is argued that external population should see greater benefits, 
and not greater problems as a result of reverse logistics activities (Presley et al., 2007).  
 
The social aspect in the frame of current research is chiefly addressed through integration of 
economic and ecological aspects. Getting extended use of an asset and avoiding it going to 
landfills is generally considered to be socially responsible, as comprehensive RSC projects 
help to prevent undesirable environmental consequences, positively impact the company’s 
margins, and thus provide benefits to all actors in the SC (Rogers et al., 2010; Stock & Mulki, 
2009). Measures to reduce and manage waste can have a positive effect on life quality of the 
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community as whole, while preventing avoidable food waste in particular is also a question of 
ethics and morality (Schrettle et al., 2014; Mena et al., 2011). 
 
It is argued that RSCs, where sound disposal decisions are taken, can positively impact 
sustainability by facilitating profit generation and can benefit the firm and its customers 
(Rogers et al., 2010). Food waste cutting activities also cut overall production costs, which 
will further reduce the price for the consumers, add value to the product, and positively affect 
all the other actors along the SC. Less wasted food implies smaller costs of handling it, thus, 
benefitting public administration agencies that could allocate this money for other society 
needs (VCMC, 2012). It has also been calculated that if retailers and wholesalers could reduce 
their amount of food waste by 20 %, they would have saved 121 millions of SEK (Fogelberg 
et al. 2011; Monier et al., 2010). Such savings would positively impact economy, which 
would mean increased benefits for the society as a whole. Contrastingly, dealing with 
processing returns in a way that makes the firm incur additional costs rather than profits 
means that the final consumer of a the firm’s product will pay more and the society will enjoy 
less benefits (Rogers et al., 2010; Stock & Mulki, 2009).  
 
Moreover, a firm successfully implementing a reverse logistics into its strategy might 
encourage competitors to follow the same trend and make the whole industry more 
sustainable (Schrettle et al., 2014; Mark-Herbert et al., 2010). It is argued that decreasing the 
amount of avoidable waste is possible when SC actors act in cooperation, which leads to 
better communication, better ordering and tuned production (Kaipia et al. 2013; VCMC, 
2012). Thus, a successful attempt in decreasing waste in the RSC will mean better 
relationships between SC actors, which will enhance the social dimension on organizational 
level.  
 
Some researchers, such as Stock and Mulki (2009) see the take-back agreement between 
suppliers/manufactures and retailers as a source for enhancing the loyalty between retailer and 
supplier. Business processes such as procurement, manufacturing, and distribution generate 
value for a particular customers or market. RSC is one of such processes, which can 
potentially lead to sustainable improvements, as it facilitates the move of the supplier-retailer 
relationship from a more transaction-oriented towards more collaboration-oriented and creates 
good conditions for value-sharing (Jensen et al., 2013). A better value-sharing relationship 
between SC actors is also socially beneficial and may lead to lower prices for the consumer. 
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3 Method 
 
This chapter describes the research approach, as well as the methods chosen for empirical data 
collection and analysis. It also includes the discussion of the study’s trustworthiness and 
validity.   
 
3.1 Research approach 
 
The relative novelty of the problem and the exploratory approach of a desired research 
contribution suggested the choice of inductive approach with a qualitative method (Nyström 
1998, cited in Mark-Herbert, 2002). The main difference between qualitative and quantitative 
approaches lies in the objectives and emphasis of the research (Ghauri & Gronhaug, 2005). 
The objective of a quantitative study is to measure and/ or conduct statistical analysis for 
generalization, while qualitative research does not employ measurement as its main objective 
and rather focuses on meanings and phenomena in a specific context (Bryman and Bell, 2007, 
p. 153). This research is purely qualitative in a sense that it does not involve any 
quantification such as measuring waste, emissions, economic losses etc. The main objective 
of this study is not to measure the effects of take-back practice, but rather to explore if any 
such effects exist and how they are affecting supply chain sustainability. For that reason the 
qualitative approach was chosen to be most appropriate, as the study deals with exploring 
specific phenomenon of take-back clause through scrutinizing existing relevant literature 
followed by empirical examination using the data from interviews.  
 
3.2 Literature Review   
 
In order to get a broader insight into the subject, derive necessary theories and analyze chosen 
cases vast and continual search on academic articles have been undertaken. First of all, key 
words have been formulated to arrive at relevant articles. Some examples of those are: take-
back clause/practice, marketing returns, reverse supply chains, close loop supply chains, 
retailer – supplier relationship, sustainable supply chains, sustainability, food waste, retailer 
market power etc. These key words were combined, reformulated and replaced by other 
possible synonyms along the study period to get access to additional relevant literature. This 
was done in order to locate the concept of take-back in the literature on SCs in general and, 
specifically, food SC. Moreover, several thesis papers (Eriksson, 2012; Locklear, 2000) and 
research reports (Gustavsson, et al., 2013) were selected to get both detailed and broad 
overview on the topic.  
 
The articles recommended by supervisors were the starting point and a yardstick when 
conducting search for the relevant literature. Further search for literature was conducted using 
the Google scholar and Uppsala and Stockholm university libraries, which led to databases 
such as Business Source Premier, EconLit, Scopus and Emerald. In addition other databases 
such as ScienceDirect, Elsevier, SpringerLink and Sage Premier have also been inspected to 
ensure that other relevant articles were not omitted. The screening revealed the relevant 
articles, which were reviewed and included into the research. Thereafter the reference lists of 
the selected articles were scanned for additional articles that could be relevant for the topic. 
The process of searching for relevant articles was continuous and lasted until the completion 
of the study (January 2015); so that newly published articles could be added.  
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3.3 Empirical study 
 
The empirical part of the study was built on semi-structured interviews with retailers, bread 
suppliers, and the documentation they provide, and has been structured as a flexible 
exploratory case study of the take-back phenomenon in the Swedish bread industry.  
 
3.3.1 Case Study  
 
According to Robson (2011), flexible study designs appropriate for exploratory work, may 
involve case study, grounded theory studies, or ethnographic studies, and are reflecting the 
complexities of real life. Applying a case study method enables to explore, describe and 
explain a phenomenon and helps to understand its patterns in a real-life context (Kaipia et al., 
2013). The unit of analysis in this study is a context bound phenomenon – take-back clause in 
bread suppliers and retailers interface in Sweden.   
 
As put by Yin (2009) “…case study is a strategy for doing research which involves an 
empirical investigation of particular contemporary phenomenon within its real life context 
using multiple source of evidence” (Yin 2009, cited in Robson 2011 p. 136). It also allows to 
fulfill different needs including the need to satisfy the researcher´s interest and get a deeper 
insight into the phenomena that is hidden from the outside observer (Jensen et al., 2013). This 
study was conducted to explore the phenomenon of reverse logistics and get a deeper insight 
into its sustainability implications in a specific context, so case study approach suited this 
purpose best. The difficulties related to case study approach are connected to the need to 
collect sufficient information to portray particular features of the studied phenomenon and to 
identify the characteristics that are common for several cases (Ghauri & Gronhaug, 2005). 
Studying the phenomenon within the context of not one, but all three bread suppliers where it 
exists, helps to surpass these difficulties.  
 
3.3.2 Interviews  
 
The semi-structured interviews with bread suppliers’ representatives lasted from 30 to 60 
minutes and with retailers from 15 to 30 minutes. Bryman and Bell (2007, p. 474) point out 
that, “…semi-structured interviews attempt to explore the interviewees’ view on a particular 
phenomenon, identify what they see as more important, as well as allow to make general 
conclusions”. These characteristics and the fact that semi-structured interviews are adaptable 
made them the best-suited method for data collection for the purposes of this study.  
 
The interviews were conducted face-to-face, as it allows investigating the issues of interest 
through observing non-verbal cues and getting a highly illuminating material (Robson, 2011). 
Those participants who requested the questions to be sent in advance (Interviewees A, B, 8, & 
9) received e-mails with approximate topics of the coming interviews. Others were only 
shortly briefed on the topic of thesis and its main research questions when they were asked 
about the possibility to conduct an interview.  
 
The interviewees were selected based on their knowledge about take-back clause in particular 
and reverse SC as whole. At the retail stores the people who are supposed to have the greatest 
knowledge about take-back practice, i.e. either the person responsible for bread section or the 
store manger took part in the study. All interviewees from bread suppliers were either 
companies’ executive officers or the region’s senior managers. Interviewees for the interview 
sessions with bread suppliers, were appointed by the companies themselves after the purpose 
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of the study have been explained to them. All appointed interviewees held senior positions at 
the companies for a considerably long period to be very well aware of all the processes in the 
company, including the peculiarities of reverse logistics and take-back practice.    
 
3.3.3 Interview questions 
 
The interview questions were designed based on the literature review and theoretical 
framework and represented a checklist of areas to be covered. In order to answer the first 
research question and get a better understanding of reverse supply networks in the Swedish 
bread industry, all participants were asked a set of questions about the overall design of take-
back logistics. These questions were supposed to provide insights on issues related to other 
research questions as well. The rest of the questions were split into areas covering power-
relation issues and sustainability impacts (see Appendices 2 & 3). Questions aimed at 
discovering sustainability implications were constructed to address the issues related to each 
of the sustainability pillars (economic, environmental and social) of the bread RSC. 
 
As the interviews were semi-structured, questions were open-ended represented a guidance 
for the areas to be covered during the interview, rather then the fixed questionnaires. The 
wording of questions was adjusted during the actual interviews and additional clarifying 
questions were asked when considered necessary.  
 
3.4 Choice of country, sector and participants 
 
This paper studies the take-back clause practice in bread industry. As the study was concerned 
with exploration of the possible instances of market power and their consequences, it was 
necessary to obtain the opinions of both suppliers and retailers on the phenomenon of take-
back. Identifying what aspects of the reverse logistics they see as important will help to 
generalize the conclusions on the overall sustainability of the practice in question.  The parties 
participating in the case study are the major brands and corporate groups in the Swedish retail 
market as well as three main suppliers of soft/fresh bread (see table 1 & figure 2).  
 
3.4.1 Suppliers 
 
The paper explores the implications of take-back clause only in Swedish bread industry 
mainly due to geographic convenience and the existence of the phenomena (take-back clause).  
Studies have shown that perishable food such as fresh bakery, fruits and vegetables contribute 
the most to the avoidable food waste (Kaipia et al., 2013; Gustavsson & Stage, 2011). On 
contrast to fresh fruits and vegetables, the logistics of bread in Sweden includes reverse 
supply chain with take-back practice. Therefore the bread industry has been selected.  
 
The study involves three biggest bread suppliers in Sweden (Pågen, Fazer & Polarbröd), as 
they are the only companies that have reverse logistics and take-back agreements with their 
partners (see figure 2). Pågen, Fazer and Polarbröd together constitute 85% of Swedish bread 
market, holding 40-45%, 20- 30% and 14.5% of market share respectively (Interviewee A, 
2014;  Comapny C´s Sustainability Report, 2012). All the three companies agreed to give 
interviews, so the data obtained helps to generalize some conclusions within the industry as 
well as the whole country.   
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3.4.2 Retailers  
 
Since the aim of the paper is to investigate the reverse logistics in the interrelation between 
suppliers and retailers, nine stores representing all major retail chains and corporate 
ownerships in Sweden were contacted. These are Axfood (Willys, Hemköp and Tempo), ICA  
(ICA Kvantum), Coop (Coop Konsum), Bergendahls (Matdax and Mattöppet) and others 
(German Lidl and Danish Netto) (see table 1). This list of retailers was selected based on list 
of all major brands and corporate ownerships in Swedish retail market presented by Eriksson 
(2012, p.16, see appendix 1). The intention was to interview a representative of every retail 
chains presented in the list. In total nine retailers representing each retail chain from all 
corporate ownerships were selected to participate in the study.  
 
 
 
 
The retail stores were initially contacted by phone, email or through short visits. During these 
contacts initial information on take-back provision has been collected. Stores were asked if 
they had take-back agreement with any suppliers and if they are willing to tell more about it 
Figure 2: Bread suppliers in Sweden (%=market share) [own 
creation] 
Table 1: Major retail chains and corporate& corporate 
ownerships in Sweden (adopted from Eriksson, 2012, p.16) 
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in a short interview. It has then become clear that most of the retail stores have take-back 
agreement with above mentioned bread suppliers (see figure 2). After repetitive random calls 
to retail stores across Stockholm, nine retailer have agreed to participate in the study. 
Although the retail stores participating in the study were all located in the city of Stockholm, 
they varied in size, location and turnover to bring an alternative view on the take-back 
networks. The sampling was done based on geographical convenience and was purposive, so 
that it satisfies the specific needs of this research - having a representative from each major 
retailer chains and making sure the stores vary in size and location. The stores were also 
selected on basis of their willingness and readiness to participate and share companies´ data. 
This, however, was a satisfying outcome concerning the sensitivity of the subject, i.e. the 
unwillingness of store managers to discuss the issue of food waste in their stores.  
 
3.5 Data collection and analysis 
 
One of the potential drawbacks of qualitative studies is the accumulation and collection of 
irrelevant data when a research question is poorly understood (Ghauri & Gronhaug, 2005). 
The research question of this study is concerned with power-relations between retailers and 
bread suppliers and consequent sustainability implications of take-back practice, which might 
be quite broad. To avoid collection of irrelevant data, delimitations for which aspects will be 
the focus of the study were made in chapter 2.2 of the theoretical framework. Both the 
collection and analysis of the data is limited to the discussion of issues put forward in the 
theoretical framework and in the aim description.  
 
To facilitate the analysis of a quite large set of qualitative data from the interviews, thematic 
coding approach was used. Robson (2011) defines coding as “… identifying and recording 
one or more passages of the text or other data items [… that] exemplify the same theoretical 
or descriptive idea” (p.474). After carefully reviewing the data, particular codes that 
represent potential interest were determined based on key themes identified in literature 
review and theoretical framework. These themes were used as a basis for further analysis and 
interpretation (Robson, 2011).  All the interpretations of obtained data were continually 
justified on step-by-step basis.  
 
3.6 Trustworthiness and validity 
 
The validity of the study was assured by accuracy and completeness of the data. The 
interviews were audiotaped which allowed focusing more on the interview process and 
provided permanent record of the data. Then audio materials were transcribed to assist in 
subsequent analysis (Robson, 2011). In order to guard the research from bias the 
interpretations of respondents´ answers were sent back to them for validation. Moreover, all 
the recorded information and raw materials have been saved to insure that no necessary 
information is omitted.  
 
All the interviewees were informed about the purpose of the research and participation in the 
study was voluntary. Ethical issues were negotiated and certain confidentiality nuances like 
non-disclosure of names and sensitive data were agreed to ensure credibility. For instance, 
some of the bread suppliers and retailers have preferred to stay anonymous and for avoiding 
any accidental disclosures it was decided to make all the participants anonymous. Bread 
supplier names have been replaced with letters whereas retailers’ – with numbers.  
 
 24 
 
In order to further enhance validity and rigor of the research, data triangulation was used 
through backing up the interview data with companies’ environmental/sustainability reports. 
Moreover, the triangulation effect was also strengthened through collecting data from both 
suppliers and retailers. Besides, by including all bread suppliers that have reverse SC in the 
research this study strengthened the internal generalizability i.e. generalizability of 
conclusions within the context of take-back practice in bread industry in Sweden (Jensen et 
al., 2013).  
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4 Empirical Findings  
 
This chapter presents the findings from the interviews with bread suppliers and retail stores, 
as well as some relevant secondary data from bread suppliers’ sustainability reports and web 
pages. It gives an overview of the bread reverse logistics schemes, as well as some 
peculiarities of take-back terms are articulated in this chapter. The findings are divided into 
two parts, first representing bread suppliers’ perspective followed by retailers’ perspective on 
the subject.  
 
4.1 Bread suppliers’ perspective  
 
This section presents the findings about how the reverse logistics is carried out by the 
Swedish bread suppliers, including the description of ordering routines and disposal channels. 
Description of certain contractual terms, cooperation issues and flaws of take-back agreement 
that were raised by bread suppliers’ conclude the section. 
 
4.1.1 Swedish bread industry and take-back agreement  
 
The bakery business has very short lead times. It is very important in this business to organize 
good logistics to make sure the bread arrives to the shelves while it is still fresh. So bread 
suppliers strive to deliver the bread to the retailers as quickly as possible (Interviewees A, B, 
& C, 2014). The manager from one of the bread suppliers explains that this is the main reason 
why almost everywhere in the world bread suppliers deliver their bread themselves 
(Interviewee A, 2014). In many countries bread suppliers distribute the bread, while the stores 
order it and take care of leftovers (Ibid.). However, in Sweden baking industry looks a little 
bit different. In most cases bread suppliers are responsible for ordering and delivering as well 
as taking back the leftovers for disposal (Interviewees A, B, & C, 2014).   
 
Although most of the bread suppliers and store managers interviewed acknowledge that the 
take-back agreement has been present for more than 30 years, they admit that they are 
unaware of how exactly it was initially developed, and see it as a taken-for granted logistics 
pattern (Interviewees B, C & 1-9, 2014). Nevertheless, one of the interviewees asserts that 
take-back clause was introduced due to high competition among bread suppliers (Interviewee 
A, 2014). He narrates that a long while ago one of the baking companies proposed to retailers 
to take care of leftovers in exchange for extra shelf space for its bread so the company could 
sell more of its bread. Apparently the retailers were more than happy to accept the 
proposition. Interviewee A believes that since then other actors in bread industry followed the 
trend and started to take responsibility for returns and for the whole value chain (Ibid.).  
 
All the bread suppliers in Sweden, which have take-back agreement together represent 
roughly 90% of the pre-packed bread market and have similar logistics routines (Interviewees 
A, B & C, 2014; Company A´s Environmental Report, 2013; Company C´s Sustainability 
Report, 2012). The drivers collect expiring bread at the time they deliver a fresh batch 
(Interviewees A, B & C, 2014). The drivers that deliver bread are also the sellers who are 
regularly servicing certain district with a number of retailers. One driver usually services the 
same stores and is responsible to forecast and negotiate the assortment and quantities of bread 
that should be delivered to a specific store. All companies’ sellers, have provision-based 
salaries (Ibid.). The more they sell, and the less returns they have, the higher is their salary. 
The returns are crediting drivers’ bonuses. As stated by interviewee A (2014), “…the drivers 
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are paid for how much they sell, not for the returns, and they have to carry it back, and they 
don’t get paid for that”.   
 
4.1.2 Ordering routines  
 
There are slight differences in companies’ ordering routines. For instance, company C 
produces the bread assortment that is instantly frozen down after it had been baked, and is 
then stored in big freezers. This allows needed amount of bread to be taken out off freezer any 
time before the delivery (Company C´s Sustainability Report, 2012). To make sure that a 
wide bread assortment is delivered to each store, the company has equipped its trucks with 
freezers, so that there is always some extra supply in case they need to deliver more. Sellers 
of company C do not need to plan very carefully in advance and adjust the available 
assortment in the trucks and decide on the assortment they need to bring right at the store 
(Interviewee C, 2014). That makes company C’s ordering times much shorter compared to the 
companies A and B, where the driver has to make order to the bakeries for his/her truck two 
days in advance (Interviewees A & B, 2014).  
 
Bakeries for company A and B get a fixed order and know exactly the amount of bread they 
need to produce for each driver two days in advance (Ibid.). According to Interviewee A, this 
means that excess production is almost zero because the bakery does not have to forecast, and 
simply produces bread on fixed orders (Interviewee A, 2014). Yet, as stated in company´s 
sustainable report for 2013, adjusting the baking according to incoming orders is among the 
main challenges to reduce food waste at bakeries (Company A´s Environmental Report, 
2013). It can be explained by the fact that the driver is compelled to guess what assortment 
and quantities each store would need in two days. It is not possible for him to order a day 
before the actual delivery, which would in fact make it easier for him/her to base the order on 
the actual sales and store’s needs of that day (Interviewees A & B, 2014).  
 
However, as interviewee A (2014) states, “when the ordered articles are received and loaded 
to the truck, the driver can play with the planned assortment by adjusting the quantity for 
each individual store – he/she has a sort of a warehouse in his own truck”. Moreover, as the 
seller is working with the same stores on a regular basis, he/she is supposed to have a good 
feeling of the bread demand in a certain store (Interviewees A, B & C, 2014). In order to 
forecast the demand as accurately as possible the driver tries to get hold of any historical data 
on the sales and discusses the order with a person who is responsible for the bread department 
at a retail store. He/she tries to find out about campaigns, competitors’ strategies and gain any 
other relevant information that can influence the bread sales. But many stores seldom have 
anybody present in their bread departments to discuss the bread demand because, in essence, 
the bread supplier is fully responsible for shelf replenishment. This means that the driver is 
most often fully responsible for deciding on the order (Interviewees A & B, 2014). 
 
Ideally, by the end of the day the driver should have no bread articles in the truck – so he/she 
tries to minimize the risks of excessive returns (Interviewees A, B & C, 2014). For company 
A, for instance, the maximum average returns target is 7% (Interviewee A, 2014). Interviewee 
A maintains that if this target is met, by the end of the day the shelves will be almost empty, 
and the next day the sellers will come and fill it up again (Ibid.). This is a way to keep the 
balance between satisfied consumers (able to find the bread on the shelves) and a minimal 
returns rate for all three bread suppliers (Interviewees A, B & C, 2014). Still, the 
representatives of companies A and B admit that it is very hard to know several days in 
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advance the exact amount and assortment of bread that should be delivered to a specific store 
(Interviewees A & B, 2014). 
 
To ensure that the driver has the smallest amount of bread returns company A even launched 
a training program aiming to educate sellers on how to work in a uniform way so that they are 
able to adjust the amount and range of bread according to demand. Every bread facility has a 
person who discusses the return issues with truck drivers, educates and governs them on the 
questions of delivery and take-back. Specific action plans are developed for those sellers who 
have larger returns (A’s Environmental Report, 2013). In addition, to help address the 
possible forecasting faults the planning of each district a driver serves is planned in a way to 
include a big store. Interviewee A explains, “our seller first drives to the big store and then 
continues to smaller ones, and if he/she has bread left in his truck, he/she goes back to the big 
one and fills the shelves there, because it can swallow quite a lot. And vice versa, when the 
driver arrives at big store and sees that it needs more bread than he has planned he/she tries 
to save for smaller stores” (Interviewee A, 2014). 
 
 
4.1.3 Reverse logistics and disposal channels in Swedish bread industry  
 
All companies have a certain number of bakeries that are connected to depots, each serving a 
particular region. A certain number of trucks are linked to a depot where they pick up fresh 
bread and drop the returned bread (see figure 3). The returned bread is then stored in 
containers until farmers come and collect it for feeding their pigs. A farmer usually buys the 
bread from companies’ nearest depots (see figure 3). They are interested to buy bread from 
bread suppliers and usually sign yearly contracts with them. The farmers even invest in 
special machines that separate the plastic packaging from the bread. All the bread suppliers 
agree that they usually have no problem disposing of the returned bread (Interviewees A, B & 
C, 2014). 
 
 
 
 
The bread is sold for about 1 SEK per kg, which is quite a good deal for farmers 
(Interviewees A & B, 2014). It still has some days until the expiry date, some of bread might 
be even fresh, as it might be returned due to damaged packaging. So farmers most often can 
still make a good use of all the bread they buy (Interviewee B, 2014). But according to 
interviewees A and B (2014), this deal is not equally good for bread suppliers (Interviewees A 
Figure 3: A closed loop supply chain for Swedish bread suppliers (blue line represents RSC) [own creation] 
* A small portion of company A’s returned bread goes to Stadsmission	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& B, 2014). As put by the interviewee from company B “we don’t cover our production costs 
by selling the bread to farmers; the production cost of 1 kg of bread is about 14 -15 SEK and 
we sell the returned bread for only 1 SEK per kg”. It does not even cover their costs for taking 
the bread back (time for collecting unsold bread i.e. extra time of the seller) (Interviewees A 
& B, 2014). Nevertheless, the companies have the deal to avoid throwing away the bread 
(Ibid.). Company B representative (2014) comments, “instead of throwing it we can get at 
least something”. Thus, using bread waste as feed is seen as a better alternative to incineration 
(Interviewees A, B & C, 2014). Yet, A´s representative (2014) states that “… selling it to pig 
farmers is still waste because it is an expensive way of feeding pigs”. For instance, according 
to Interviewee B, the value of bread that company B annually sends to pig farmers exceeds 
100 millions SEK (Interviewee B, 2014). 
 
Bread suppliers usually deliver two-three times a week to most stores, but the frequency 
depends on the turnover, size of that store and the negotiating skills of its owner (Interviewees 
A, B & C, 2014). One of the big stores, for instance, gets 12 deliveries a week from company 
A (Interviewee A, 2014). When it comes to returns company B lets the bread lay for three 
days and then it is taken back. In other words, the driver counts three days from the baking 
day and then removes the bread from the shelves usually on Mondays and Thursdays 
(Interviewee B, 2014). Companies A & C (2014), on the other hand, take back the bread two-
three days before the expiry date. Some stores (usually the big ones) might even require the 
company to take-back the bread three-four days before the expiry date (Interviewees A & B, 
2014). Usually in this case company A donates the returned bread to Stadsmission (a NGO for 
people in need) rather than selling it to farmers, as there are still quite a few days before the 
bread expires (see figure 3). The NGO then freezes the bread and de-freezes the needed 
quantity anytime it is necessary (Interviewee A, 2014). But only few retailers demand the 
bread to be taken back so soon, so it constitutes only a small part of all returned bread, and 
hence only a small portion goes to NGOs (Interviewees A & B, 2014).  
 
4.1.4 Negotiation of contractual terms for ordering 
 
In comparison to the local bakeries that negotiate directly with retail stores, companies A, B 
and C negotiate the terms of contract with headquarters of retail chains (Interviewees A, B 
and C, 2014). However companies also have to negotiate with stores about promotions, 
campaigns, shelf-space, etc. It means that they have to talk on both levels, which adds to the 
workload (Ibid.). According to interview B (2014), the returns rate may depend on the party 
bread company negotiates with. Company B has more returns from stores, where the contracts 
are negotiated with headquarters rather than from individually governed stores. This is 
because stores governed from headquarters have less power to decide, while in individual 
stores it is possible to do business directly with the storeowners, which is easier, as special 
details about ordering and the take-back can be re-negotiated (Interview B, 2014) The agreed 
terms depend partly on the size of the store and partly on the owner of the store (Ibid.). Yet, 
generally the contracts that companies have with their customers (retail chains) do not vary. 
According to this contract, companies A, B and C place the orders and take care of everything 
else, including the leftovers (Interviewees A, B and C, 2014).  
 
However companies A and C, have few exceptions (Interviewees A & C, 2014). Company C 
takes back the bread only when it is agreed that the company is entirely responsible for both 
the quantity and assortment of ordered bread. As put by the interviewee from company C 
(2014) “if the retailer says, I want this and that, then it has to take its own responsibility for 
the leftovers”. Company A has a little different policy for smaller and/or distant stores 
(Interviewee A, 2014). For instance, if a store cannot make an order for a minimum of 1500 
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SEK, or is very distant, i.e. located outside of company A’s normal take-back logistics, the 
cost of taking back the bread might be too expensive. In this case the company does not 
perform the take-back logistics or does not work with the store at all. Even if company A 
decides not to give a particular small store the full service (i.e. to get the orders and deliver 
the bread without taking it back), it may anyhow get the bread delivered to it if the store is 
located within their usual logistics. In this case it is the store’s responsibility to make orders 
and take care of the leftovers (Ibid.). 
 
4.1.5 Bread returns rates 
 
All bread suppliers’ representative point out that the amount of returns depends on the size of 
the store, its turnover and location (Interviewees A, B & C, 2014). Bigger stores usually have 
around 5-6% in returns, while in smaller stores between 13-14% is left unsold (Interviewees 
A & B, 2014). Interviewee B (2014) suggests that the rate of returns is also high in the north 
of Sweden because it is difficult to deliver the bread there. All companies are also unanimous 
in the opinion that the returns rate is much higher if the stores themselves are responsible for 
ordering routines, rather when it is done by the companies’ sellers (Interviewees A, B & C, 
2014). They explain that a store has to take care of thousands of products, so it is hard for the 
staff to estimate exactly how much articles to order, while bread suppliers work with the same 
store regularly and have better feeling of the demand (Interviewees A, B, C & 7, 2014).  
 
One reason for that is that the stores that order themselves have to order in full carts. 
Interviewee A (2014) states: “they are most often unable to order the exact amount of articles 
they need, as they cannot order half cart, and usually order either too little or too much”. 
Companies’ drivers, on the other hand, are able to pick the exact amount of articles they need 
from the cart and allocate the rest of the cart to other stores they drive to. It makes it much 
easier to get the demanded amount of articles for each store (Ibid.). Another reason might be 
connected to the level of sellers experience. Company B’s representative and one of the store 
managers believe that greater returns arise when the inexperienced seller, i.e. a freshman, is 
managing the orders (Interviewee B & 2, 2014). Interviewees A and C (2014) revealed that 
that bread companies tried to run tests, allowing the retailers to make orders and take care of 
the leftovers. All these tests demonstrated that such arrangement leads to decreased sales, 
increased bread returns and a lot of extra costs for retailers (Interviewees A & C, 2014). 
 
According to the representative of company C, the amount of waste depends both on the store 
manager and the company’s seller. It all depends on how interested the store manager is in his 
job, and his ability to get a good idea of how much bread and what kinds the store needs 
(Interviewees A & C, 2014). Some store managers can lack understanding of how much bread 
they need, and they just want to fill the shelves with unnecessary big amount of bread, 
because the store does not take any economic risks (Interviewee C, 2014). But it also depends 
on how good company’s sellers /drivers are at their jobs (Interviewees A, B & C, 2014). 
 
4.1.6 Retailers and over-ordering 
 
Two of the bread suppliers mention that they are annoyed by the fact that retailers have no 
costs in managing returns and that they always require filling up the shelves, so that 
consumers have no problems finding any sort of bread (Interviewees A & B, 2014). 
According to company A’s representative (2014), the retailers “…don´t care about leftovers 
because it is not the retailers who is managing them”. Interviewee A (2014) continues by 
saying, “…there is a constant battle between us [Company A] and retailers’ headquarters – 
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they always complain that the shelves are not full enough”. This all makes it hard for the 
company to reach its target of 7% of bread returns (Ibid.). 
 
Bread suppliers include the cost of returns into the final price of their products. For the 
moment companies A, B and C include 7%, 6% and 4,3% respectively of waste (returns) in 
their production calculations respectively (Interviewees A & B, 2014; Company C´s 
Sustainability report, 2012). Yet two of them agree that the returns rate is usually a bit higher 
then this (around 9%) (Interviewees A & B, 2014). Interviewees A and B add that in the case 
the returns exceed its normal rate, company tries to inform the stores about it and tries to 
influence the situation through a continuous dialogue (Interviewee B, 2014; Company A´s 
Environmental Report, 2014). Company B’s representative (2014) explains that, as the 
company is managing the orders itself, it has a certain power to prevent over-ordering.  
Company C’s representative shares this view and highlights that in case a retailer 
continuously puts pressure on their driver and demands to order more, company’s managers 
step in and negotiate (Interviewee C, 2014). If retailer insists on ordering more than the driver 
calculates, it is offered to manage the returns itself (Ibid.). 
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4.1.7 Reflections on existing take-back logistics 
 
Change the current take-back agreement 
  
As mentioned earlier, bread suppliers govern the whole process (ordering, delivering, taking 
care of unsold bread) (Interviewees A, B & C, 2014). Two of the interviewees also mention 
that companies were trying to change the system and both company A and B (2014) admit 
that they did not succeed because retailers are against taking any extra responsibilities. As the 
company C’s representative (2014) puts it, “…we take care of all other things, so one can say 
that we are basically renting their shelves”. Both Interviewees A and C highlight (2014) that 
such system is extremely good for the stores, because they only get profit, and have no risks 
and no costs. Company B’s representative in his turn states, “we [bread suppliers] can 
hypothetically deliver as much as we want, but we only get paid for what has been sold” 
(Interviewee B, 2014). Bread suppliers invoice the retailers; take the returns and the retailer 
only pays the net. The retailers get full refund for everything that has not been sold 
(Interviewees A, B & C, 2014).  
 
Even company B’s representative admitted that his company tried to change the existing 
arrangement, he does not see the full termination of take-back agreement as a better 
alternative for contracting (Interviewee B, 2014). Company B’s representative assures that if 
stores started to order themselves and take care of the returns, company B would have to 
change the well-established logistics system. It would need to negotiate with all the store 
chains about the new contract, workout new pricelists and substitute the working routines of 
sellers who would become simple drivers, whose only function would be to drop the bread at 
the store (Ibid.). The latter would be much cheaper for the company: without additional duties 
the drivers’ salaries would become significantly smaller. Company B’s representative 
presumes that such changes would take a lot of time and efforts. Yet, he admits that the ideal 
agreement for the company would be when the retailer takes care of returns (Ibid.). Company 
C, on the other hand, does not want to change the existing contract, as it is afraid that the 
retailers would order too little, and the company might suffer from shrinking sales 
(Interviewee C, 2014). 
 
Interview A admits that the fact that they take care of the returned bread does not add value to 
the company (Interviewee A, 2014). All the three bread suppliers have the goal to minimize 
waste at their agenda (Interviewee B, 2014; Company A´s Environmental Report, 2013; 
Company C´s Sustainability Report, 2012). However, high variability of bread demand (even 
if there are very few campaigns) and retailers’ persistent demand to fill up shelves makes it 
tricky to reach the company’s target to minimize the waste, i.e. to lower the returns rate 
(Interviewee A, 2014; A´ Environmental Report, 2013). As put by Interviewee A (2014), in a 
fresh bread industry, one cannot have zero waste per se. Zero waste would mean empty 
shelves and dissatisfied consumers who cannot find the type of bread they are looking for. 
The representatives of company A and company C emphasize that non of companies wants 
their shelve space to be empty, because that would also mean that they sell less than it is 
demanded and do not maximize their profit Too much bread on the shelves, on the other hand, 
would mean costs for overproduction and managing excess waste. So the most important task 
is to keep a balance between these two things, which is rather difficult (Interviewees A & C, 
2014). 
 
Company A’s representative (2014) believes that retailers’ lack of incentive to minimize the 
returns is what makes the current model of reverse logistics imperfect. Interviewees B and C 
(2014), on the other hand, suppose that for the moment the working process is functioning 
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pretty well and the business is quite profitable with current returns rate. They add that if the 
companies will keep it within this range, there will be no need to change anything at all.  
 
Possible measures to reduce the returns rates 
 
Interviewee A claims that a joint decision on how much to order and joint responsibility for 
returns is the key to keep balance between retailers desire to keep shelves filled and suppliers´ 
ambition to decrease bread returns (Interviewee A, 2014). He supposes that the best way to 
reduce the waste is to allow the driver and the bread responsible person to discuss the next 
order. Both company C and company A agree on the fact that there should be more discussion 
and cooperation between the store and companies’ sellers (Interviewees A & C, 2014). 
According to company C’s representative, “… there won’t be any troubles with retailers if we 
[suppliers] don’t deliver too little. And to deliver enough bread is for our own benefit, 
because we want to sell more” (Interviewee C, 2014). 
 
Another approach to reduce the waste, according to Interviewee A, is to share the costs for the 
leftovers at least to a certain extent. Today there is no pressure on retailers to minimize the 
returns (Interviewees A & B, 2014). Companies A and B (2014) agree that when the retailers 
order their own bread they have no returns because they do not want to pay for waste. In that 
scenario they are much more cautious. Retailer representatives confirm this fact. For instance, 
when dealing with “own” bread (baked at A & B but sold under the store´s label), store 7 is 
responsible both for orders and disposal itself. The store manager assures that he tries his best 
to order in accordance with the demand and that the amount of unsold bread of store’s own 
brand is insignificant – about 1% of the whole order (Interviewee 7, 2014). Interviewee A 
(2014) also adds that with take-back contract retailers never put discounts in the bread 
department, because they do not have any benefit in that. He supposes that if retailers had to 
take care of some leftovers, they would set up the campaigns and sell more bread, and it 
would be another incentive for minimizing the waste (Ibid.) 
 
So taking a shared responsibility for waste is the next level of the cooperation with retailers 
that the company A strives to achieve. The interviewee A (2014) explains how it could look 
in reality: “we would be ready to take the returns only up to 7%, but what is above would be 
the retailer’s responsibility”. He believes that sharing some risk would serve a good incentive 
for retailers to work towards waste minimization as well (Ibid.). According to interviewee A 
(2014), their managers are constantly discussing the terms of the contract with retailers, as 
they consider that it is impossible to decrease the returns if there is no joint incentive for that. 
It is unfortunate for the company A that it has not succeeded in persuading the retailers to 
build such cooperation and have retailers more involved (Ibid.). 
 
4.2 Retailers’ perspective 
 
The stores participating in the study belong to different retailer chains, and are situated in 
different geographical regions. All stores that have been interviewed have take-back 
agreement with at least one of the three bread suppliers (see table 2). As mentioned earlier, 
bread suppliers have different agreements with retailers depending on retailers’ chain, 
location, turnover, etc. All stores that have the take back agreement pay the supplier only for 
what have been sold and get refund for returned bread (Interviewees 1-9, 2014). In case 
suppliers only deliver the bread, the stores take care of the bread leftovers themselves (Ibid.). 
All stores that handle leftovers themselves, send the unsold bread to trash containers at the 
back of the store (Interviewees 2 & 4, 2014). The insignificant amounts of other bread brands 
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that can sometimes be present in the stores assortment are also sent to trash containers. All 
bread waste then is sorted as either “packaged waste” or “organic waste” (Interviewees 1-9, 
2014). Organic waste goes to organic recycling, while the packaged waste is most probably 
burned (Interviewee 6, 2014). Given that the take-back agreement is present, the bread is 
taken-back at the time when fresh bread is delivered. The bread is usually taken back two-
three days before the expiry date (Interviewees 1-9, 2014). Yet, as findings proved, this, as 
well as other terms of take-back agreements, may differ from store to store. These differences 
and peculiar elements of take-back practice in different stores are summarized in a table 
below (see table 2).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.1 Stores without take-back agreement 
 
Interviewee 4 (2014) supposes that whether a store gets a take-back agreement or not depends 
on the chain, and how big the store is. He presumes that his store could not get the deal with 
company A because the store has quite small turnover. He suggests that, “If you are a bigger 
store, you get a better deal. Some chains in our corporate group may get a better agreement 
and have both delivery and take-back services because they have a better turnover”. 
 
Interviewee 4 (2014) clarifies that company A offered Store 4 two options. One option 
presupposed that company A would only deliver the bread if the store is able to make a 
minimum-quantity order, and if the store would additionally take care of the waste. The store 
manager confesses that such agreement would mean extra costs for the store – cleaning the 
shelves, moving the bread that expires, discarding it, etc. The other option allowed to order 
below the minimum order, but in that case the store would pay for the delivery as well, and 
still take care of the waste. As interviewee 4 puts it, “we would try to minimize the costs by 
not paying for the delivery and getting the bigger order, but will then have to deal with the 
bigger quantity of the leftovers, and managing the leftovers contributes to extra costs” (Ibid.).  
 
Other stores that do not get the take-back contract find the ways to minimize the discarding 
costs. Interview 2 (2014), for instance, unveils that the store gets 5% discount from company 
A for taking care of leftovers. The store´s personnel attaches discount tags on expiring bread 
from the company A in order to minimize the waste.  For instance, the bread with initial 
Table 2:  Type of retail stores and their take-back contracts 
 34 
 
(when-fresh) price of 20 SEK would drop to 10 SEK and the bread would be put into special 
basket by the entry door. The manager complains that selling expiring bread for 10 SEK does 
not cover his costs, but it still saves on discarding costs. He states, “… to be honest, I would 
prefer the kind of agreement we have with company B, because it allows the store to make 
profits, while when dealing with company A we sometimes end up with losses “ (Interview 2, 
2014). Contrastingly, stores that have the take back agreement, do not have any of such 
problems. Store 6, for instance does not have any discounts on bread that approaches its 
expiry date – the prices are still on, until the bread is taken back by the driver. The store 
manager explains that “if the store decreases the price, it is only good for the suppliers, but 
the store’s profit on bread decreases” (Interviewee 6, 2014). 
 
 
4.2.2 Maintaining the current take-back agreement 
 
The absolute majority of the interviewed store managers consider take-back clause as a 
profitable agreement, which they would like to maintain. In general, the stores seem to be 
satisfied with the current agreement. As interviewee 1 (2014) puts it, “If we were not satisfied, 
the store would probably prefer to order the bread itself”. The store managers believe that 
companies A, B and C are doing a better job in forecasting the demand and minimizing 
leftovers then the stores do (Interview 1, 2014). Interviewee 6 (2014), for example, states that 
he would be more cautious if he made bread orders himself, and might end up with either 
insufficient profits for the store or too much leftovers. He states, “… if I do that [renegotiate 
the terms of agreement], it would most probably backfire on me “ (Interviewee 6, 2014). They 
all admit that the costs of managing waste might be significant for the store, if companies A, 
B and C did not have the reverse logistics (Interviewees 1-9, 2014). This is because stores 
usually have contracts with the garbage collectors, and buy a certain amount of containers 
(Interviewees 1, 2, 4, 6, 8 & 9, 2014). Regardless of how full the container is the store still 
pays the same price (Interviewee 4, 2014). According to interviewees 4 and 2 (2014), if the 
store would have to deal with access bread waste, it would most probably have much higher 
waste costs in general. 
 
Interviewee 1 (2014) reveals that there have been discussions about changing the current 
agreement so that stores would handle both the orders and disposal themselves and in 
exchange bread suppliers would lower the bread prices. Interviewee 7 informs that around 4 
years ago the chain that Store 7 belongs to tried to change the ordering practice so that stores 
started to make orders and handle the waste themselves. According to him, it did not work out 
very well, and the stores had to deal with a lot of waste. Now when companies A, B and C 
have their own logistics and take back the leftovers the amount of returns dropped 
(Interviewee 7, 2014).  
 
Interviewee 5 (2014), on the contrary, supposes that bread suppliers have not tried to change 
the contract, because “… they know it will not work for them”. She presumes that if bread 
sellers did not have the commission-based salaries, they would try to sell to the store 
unnecessary big amount of bread, which might have resulted in unnecessary waste. Today the 
store collaborates quite well with bread suppliers, and the bread department manager 
supposes that it is better for the store and for the customers when suppliers are fully 
responsible for the whole logistics (Interviewee 5, 2014). 
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4.2.3 Negotiating the amount of bread to be delivered  
 
The bread suppliers’ drivers are in general solely responsible for how much to deliver 
(Interviewees 1-9, 2014). Yet, according to interviewees 1, 6 and 7 (2014), it is possible to 
make a suggestion on how much the store needs. Interviewee 7 (2014) states, ”Usually I try to 
convince the drivers to order much more bread then they plan to, and most of the time I 
succeed in it. But in any case it is them, who decide on the amount of bread that they will 
deliver”. The parties may negotiate how much bread should be delivered, and how much of 
specific kind the store can sell (Ibid.). In case of increasing returns some stores even try to 
address the problem of forecasting together with bread suppliers and discuss how to order 
more of the best-selling bread types (Interviewee 1, 2014). 
 
Most of the store managers that have been interviewed are aware of the fact that supplier 
sellers’ salaries are calculated depending on how much bread they sell and the amount of 
bread they take back, and understand that the more bread sold combined with few returns is 
the best outcome for the bread suppliers (Interviewees 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 & 9, 2014). Some of 
them mention that neither the bread suppliers nor the stores want to have many returns 
because it does not benefit anyone (Interviewees 3, 5, 8 & 6, 2014). Interviewee 3 believes 
that excess returns would mean the store´s shelves are filled with a lot of bread articles with 
approaching expiry and the store does not want that, it rather prefers the bread to be delivered 
in smaller quantities every day (Interviewee 3, 2014).  
 
Yet negotiating is not always cloudless. Interviewee 6, for instance, assures that although 
bread suppliers want to sell as much bread as possible, it can sometimes be difficult to 
simultaneously have low returns, as store wants the shelves to be fully stocked. The manager 
of Store 6 states, “I tell them everyday that I want MUCH more bread, because they won’t 
deliver as much as I want. I expect them to fully stock the shelves, but sometimes we have to 
compromise in a way”. He adds that conflicts that he sometimes encounters arise due to the 
inability to negotiate with individual sellers/drivers. He asserts, “The conflicts I have with 
them are usually connected with what and how much they deliver – either too much or too 
little. But often it is too little” (Interviewee 6, 2014). 
 
Interviewee 7 (2014), is more satisfied with the business relations that he has with company 
A, because as he puts it, ”they are not so afraid of higher leftovers and they usually dare to 
order more”. Company B, on the contrary, is not an equally good business partner for Store 7, 
as it often orders too little. The disagreement on the point is so serious that the whole chain 
plans to stop working with company B (Interviewee 7, 2014; Interviewee B, 2014). 
 
Interviewee 6 (2014) also mentions that some disagreement may arise. There are two 
categories of products in the store: the products the store must have and the products it can 
have. It is agreed that bread suppliers are obliged to deliver the assortment the store must have 
on the shelves, and if they want to put something additionally, it is discussed with the store 
manager or the person responsible for the department. Yet, interviewee 6 claims that 
sometimes the bread salesman just delivers unnecessary bread assortment. He states, “… in 
this case I just put it in the back storage and they will have to take it back the next day”. 
 
Many store managers emphasize the prevalent aim of customer satisfaction when describing 
their agreements with bread suppliers (Interviewees 1-4, 9. 2014). Interviewee 1 (2014) 
clarifies that his ultimate goal is to satisfy consumers needs therefore he tries to make sure 
that no bread with approaching expiry dates is left on the shelves. He reveals that the store´s 
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staff controls the shelves every morning to make sure that bread suppliers have not 
deliberately left expiring bread, in hope that it will be sold. He gives an example. Since bread 
suppliers do not come on Sundays, when they come on Saturdays they may leave the bread 
that is according to the regulations should be taken off the shelves on Sundays. So the store´s 
staff have to remove this bread from the shelves themselves. As a consequence, bread 
suppliers can be dissatisfied that the shelves with their products are half-empty. Bread 
suppliers would prefer the bread to be left on the shelves as long as possible, while Store 1 
needs to follow the regulations and remove the bread (Ibid).. 
 
Interviewee 7 assumes that whether negotiation will be translated into better ordering 
practices varies from store to store, because some store managers are thinking about the 
profits and others are thinking about the customers. Store 7 always makes sure the customers 
are satisfied. He states, ”… if a consumer comes two days in a row and does not find the 
bread he/she is looking for, the person will not come back again. That is why we try to make 
sure that our customer always finds what he/she needs” (Interviewee 7, 2014).  
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5 Analysis and Discussion  
 
As put by Robson (2011, p.412), “analysis is a breaking up of something complex into 
smaller parts and explaining the whole in terms of properties of, and relations between, these 
parts”. The aim of this study was to explore the tack-back practice between Swedish bread 
suppliers and retailers, and how possible power asymmetries between suppliers and retailers 
may impact the overall sustainability of the supply chain by answering the following 
questions: 
1. How is take-back practice carried out in the Swedish bread industry? 
2. What are the power-relations behind the take-back agreement between bread suppliers 
and retailers in Sweden? 
3. What implications does this take-back agreement and power-relations have in terms of 
bread supply chain’s sustainability? 
 
The findings are broken up into facts and ideas that relate to each of the research questions 
and are explained and analyzed by comparing how the study findings relate to conclusions of 
other peer-researchers studying the reverse logistics. The findings are analyzed using the 
market power theory and then using the theory of RSC sustainability to see the relations 
between the impacts of retailers’ market power in context of take-back agreement to the 
overall sustainability of the supply chain. First the peculiarities of take-back practice in 
Swedish bread industry are discussed. Thereafter, power-relations behind take-back 
agreement between Swedish bread suppliers and retailers are analyzed, followed by the 
analysis of implications of these power relations in terms of sustainability of bread supply 
chain.  
 
 5.1. The take-back logistics in Swedish bread industry 
 
According to Jensen et al. (2013) and Halldórsson et al. (2009), extending producer 
responsibility for their products, i.e. implementation of take-back practices, has gradually 
evolved from a costly legal producer obligation to a potentially beneficial element of a more 
sustainable SC structures. In the case of Swedish bread suppliers, there were most likely no 
legal obligation to arrange for recycling of the obsolete bread. Neither was it suppliers’ 
business strategy aimed at creating value through minimization of environmental and social 
risks (Ji et al., 2014; Jensen et al., 2013; Lehr et al., 2013; Hanifan & Hoyle, 2011). The 
findings suggest that in case of Swedish bread suppliers the implementation of reverse-
logistics rather supports the arguments of Radaev (2013) and Peitz & Shin (2012), who state 
that take-back agreement is an example of rules initiated by retailers taking advantage of their 
bargaining power (this issue will be further discussed in section 5.2).  
 
The results of the study also support Jensen et al. (2013) and Guide et al. (2003), maintaining 
that the product in the CLSC might not necessarily get back to the point of origin, but can 
alternatively be used as an input for the other SC(s). In case of Swedish bread suppliers, the 
nature of a product (i.e. perishability and low heating values of bread) and re-seller policies 
(bargaining power of retailers) has led to the design of a reverse supply chain, where the 
products are not returned to the point of origin (bakeries), but are managed through 
redistribution to animal feed or donation (Interviewees A, B, C, 2014), i.e. used as input for 
other SCs. This type of recycling also corresponds to the examples of the most-wide spread 
waste management forms in the reverse SC at the distribution level mentioned by VCMC 
(2012).  
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Thus, take-back logistics in Swedish bread industry exemplifies a closed loop supply chain, 
mentioned by a number of studies focusing on the sustainable supply chain management 
(Jensen et al., 2013; Lehr et al., 2013; Hanifan & Hoyle, 2011; Halldórsson et al., 2009). The 
main difference is that in this study the reverse logistics is implemented for managing a 
perishable organic product, where the distribution phase is characterized by the active 
involvement of powerful retailers. The implications of these differences are discussed further 
in the analysis.  
 
5.2 Power - relations behind take back agreement in supplier 
retailer interface in Sweden and its implications  
 
The analysis of this section is broken down into evaluating the sources of market power that 
make it possible for Swedish retailers to exercise their bargaining power, followed by the 
discussion of how the degree of the power asymmetries differ among stores participating in 
the study. Next comes the analysis of implications these power asymmetries pose for the 
amount of overproduction and the ability of Swedish bread suppliers to maximize profits.  
 
5.2.1 Manifestation of Swedish retailers’ market power in bread take-back 
logistics  
 
Almost all stores in this study that have take-back agreement with bread suppliers represent 
quite large retail chains (few exclusions will be discussed later in sub-section 5.2.2. of this 
chapter), together holding roughly 90% of the market share in the retailer industry. Moreover, 
the participating chains are most often located in well-populated areas all around Stockholm, 
and each chain benefits from a wide geographical spread of its individual stores. The size and 
geographical expansion of retailers in Sweden, just like in most other countries give them 
huge benefits in terms of access to consumers and thus a big bargaining power in the regional 
markets (Brandow, 1969, Li, et al. 2006). Stable relationships with retailers (that are almost 
the only distribution channel) enables easy access to consumers and helps suppliers to build 
the agile supply chain, that is crucial due to perishability, high elasticity and variability of 
bread demand. According to Li, et al. (2006), such conditions in the industry represent the 
perfect opportunity for the retailers to exercise their market power. 
 
Apart from that, all of the participating retailers are also dominant players for distributing a 
huge range of commodities that consumers need to obtain on a daily basis. That is why they 
are relatively free in their choice of suppliers, for each individual product, including bread. 
This fact supports the statements of peer researchers on another strong power source of 
retailers in Sweden – diversification over products (Li, et.al, 2006, Brandow, 1969). A highly 
diversified product range allows Swedish retailers to engage in market struggles and always 
take only the best deal from the existing bread suppliers. The profits from bread sector are 
often insignificant for the retailers, relative to the profits from other convenience goods. They 
might as well quit selling bread all together (example of store 7 in this study) without any big 
risks for damaging its main sources of income, as a consumer will always return to the store 
for dozens of other products.  
 
Thus, it can be inferred that these market power sources strengthen the bargaining power of 
Swedish retailers and their ability to choose the supplier offering the most tempting deal. 
Empirical findings show that initially take-back agreement was most probably the outcome of 
such power to choose: one retailer chose a supplier offering take-back agreement, other major 
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suppliers had nothing to do but follow the same trend simply to keep the access to consumers 
(Interviewee A, 2014).  
 
The spread of this agreement was in turn fostered by another source of power available to 
retailers – concentration (Fofana &Jaffry, 2008, Brandow, 1969). The retailer industry in 
Sweden is highly concentrated – only three big corporate retailer ownerships collectively own 
the largest proportion of the industry market share (see Table 1). So it can be argued that 
Swedish retailers represent a rather strong olygopsony (Fofana & Jaffry, 2008), seeking out 
only the best deals and dictating the standards in the industry.  
 
These sources of retailers’ market power led to the establishment of take-back practice as the 
inseparable part of bread logistics throughout the whole country, changing the general market 
practices in the whole industry. This fact provides a vivid confirmation for Brandow’s (1969) 
argument, holding that a firm possessing market power can not only materially affect the 
practices of the other actors in the industry, but also bring changes to the supply chain, 
distribution channels and other actors’ services. 
 
So one can suggest that retailer chains in the Swedish industry have substantial market power 
to exert a strong influence on bread suppliers. Yet, as the Brandow (1969) puts it, the degree 
and scale of the firm (a retailer, in this case) might vary in its degree and scale. Although the 
retail chains in general possess quite big market power, the differences in the degree of power 
possessed by individual stores are traceable in the context of take-back clause phenomenon. 
These differences are discussed in the next section.  
 
5.2.2 Retailer’s/chain’s size & market power 
 
The observation that comes to front is that bread suppliers only have the full service contract 
(delivery, ordering and take-back) with stores that are part of the larger retail chains or simply 
have a big turnover (see table 2 in Empirical findings). Bread suppliers explain that they do 
not offer full service to some smaller stores because those are situated outside of normal 
logistics (Interviewees A & C, 2014). However, some of the stores like Stores 2 and 4 are not 
distant at all, but they are smaller in physical size and turnover and they do not have the take-
back agreement with company A and C respectively (Interviewees A & C, 2014). In fact 
interviewee 4 (2014) emphasizes that his store could not get the take-back agreement with 
company A because of this very reason – his store is too small. Following the arguments of 
Walden (1990) and Brandow (1969) these stores do not represent the best, access channel to 
consumers and thus have much weaker source of bargaining power. This demonstrates that in 
contracts with smaller stores, that have less power to negotiate, bread suppliers have the 
opportunity to opt out of having reverse logistics.  
 
Also, the findings reveal that the frequency of delivery and agreement on the limit of days to 
bread expiry for take-back to be performed also depends on the turnover and size of that store 
(Interviewees A, B & C, 2014). While it makes sense that bigger stores are naturally visited 
by drivers more often because of the better turnover rates, the reason why some stores might 
require suppliers to take-back the bread much earlier than others is less clear. Both companies 
and retailers’ representatives agree that the majority of bread is taken back two-three days 
before expiry, but some stores (usually bigger ones) might require the bread to be taken back 
up to four days before expiry (Interviewees A & B, 1-9 2014). Also it is clear from the 
findings that the terms of tack-back agreement is easier to re-negotiate only in case the 
individual store does not belong to certain bigger chains. Otherwise, such contract terms are 
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agreed with headquarters and are much stricter (Interviewees B, 4, 2014). It goes in line with 
the ideas presented by Brandow (1969), referring to the power that retailer chains gain from 
their market share, geographical spread and concentration and suggests that certain bigger 
stores and more powerful retailer chains have greater power in dictating certain take-back-
terms, because of their size and olygopsony power.  
 
5.2.3. Implications of power relations in the take-back contracts  
 
Previous studies by Priefer et al. (2013), VCMC (2012), Monier et al. (2010), and Parfitt et al. 
(2010) argued that major negative implications of take-back agreement in the context of 
retailers’ market power are reflected in the financial losses for the producing companies and 
in overproduction. This section of analysis will seek support for/rejection of these arguments 
in the case of Swedish bread industry. 
 
The effect of retailers’ market power on the ability of bread suppliers to maximize 
profits 
 
One of the strongest confirmation of the existence of retailer’s market power and its abuse 
using the take-back practice is the fact that suppliers A and B were trying to change the 
agreement multiple times (Interviewees A, B & 6). Even though the bread suppliers do not 
appear to be very eager to terminate the agreement completely, some terms of it are not 
beneficial to bread companies and are dictated by powerful retailers. For instance, the take-
back agreement in case of Swedish bread suppliers involves the term that enables retailers 
only pay for the bread that have been sold, and get full refund for everything that has been 
returned (Interviewees A, B, C & 1-9, 2014). Even if supplier B does not want to terminate 
the agreement, as it would mean changing the whole system, Interviewee B (2014) admits that 
ideally, it would be better if retailers handled the returns. Interviewee A (2014) also considers 
current terms of agreement not perfect and suggests sharing the responsibility for unsold 
bread with retailers.  
 
Another characteristic of current take-back agreement that can point to a power abuse on the 
part of retailers is their unwillingness to allow discounts on bread that approaches its expiry 
dates. At the moment no store that has reverse logistics for bread puts discount tags on bread 
from companies A, B and C (Interviewees A, 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 & 9, 2014). With the existing 
terms, there is no incentive for stores to increase the chances of bread to be sold. As the 
manager of store 6 puts it “if store decreases the price [when the bread approaches its expiry 
date], it is only good for the suppliers, but the store’s profit on bread decreases” (Interviewee 
6, 2014). This shows that some retailers are using take-back agreement as a tool to maximize 
their profits at the expense of the profits of bread suppliers, or as Brandow (1969, p.2) puts it, 
“[…] directly and materially affect the incomes of the firms […and] marketing practices of 
the market in which it participates”. This somewhat supports the arguments of Priefer et al 
(2013), VCMC (2012), Monier et al. (2010), and Parfitt et al. (2010), as Swedish bread 
suppliers are deprived from maximizing the profits because of take-back agreement 
(Interviewees A, B & C, 2014).  
 
The effect of retailers’ market power on overproduction 
 
Findings proved to be consistent with previous studies, arguing that product availability and 
well-stocked shelves remain a very important factor for every store (Strid et al., 2013; 
VCMC, 2012). In the case of Swedish retailers there are certain instances where big retail 
stores, usually with high turnovers, try to exercise their power through influencing orders 
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(Interviewees 1-8, 2014). Findings show that some stores make sure no expiring bread is left 
on the shelves by imposing specific rules on how many days certain type is allowed to lie on 
the shelves (Interviewees 1 & 6, 2014). Two of the bread suppliers are annoyed by the fact 
that retailers have no cost in managing returns and want their shelves to be fully stocked. 
According to the company A’s representative (2014), the retailers “… don´t care about 
leftovers because it is not the retailers who is managing them ” (Interviewee A, 2014). 
Interviewee A (2014) continues by saying, “… there is a constant battle between us 
[Company A] and retailers’ headquarters – they always complain that the shelves are not full 
enough”. The pressure on the part of some retailers appears to be quite serious, as Company B 
was forced to quit working with retailer 7 (constantly demanding higher deliveries) and the 
whole chain at all (Interviewees 7 & B, 2014).  
 
The above-mentioned lack of incentive on the part of retailers to sell the right amount of 
bread can be argued to be the potential source of small overproduction and bigger returns 
(Interviewee A, B & C, 2014). As proved by the findings, retailers are more cautious when 
they are dealing with the bread they manage or bake themselves (Ibid.). With this bread, 
retailers make sure to minimize the amount of unsold items by trying to order just enough and 
by discounting the bread that is approaching the expiry date (Interviewees A, B, 2 & 6, 2014). 
If this incentive is present, bread suppliers as well as retailers might decrease the returns, 
hence overproduction. After all, selling enough bread (not less) is a joint aim that would help 
to boost the profits of both parties (Interviewees C, 1, 6 & 7, 2014). But at the moment 
retailers seem to have enough market power to reject any additional responsibilities 
(Interviewees A, B, 2014). 
 
It might be thus concluded that there are instances of retailer market power, reflected in some 
specific terms of take-back agreement that, negatively affect bread suppliers’ profits and 
might be the source of slight overproduction, hence increased waste, which partially supports 
the arguments of  Priefer et al (2013), VCMC (2012), Monier et al. (2010), and  Parfitt et al 
(2010) . This is reflected in the power of retailers to refuse any additional responsibility for 
managing the waste, obliging bread suppliers to provide full refund for the unsold items and 
unwillingness of retailers that have take-back agreements to put any discounts on bread that is 
approaching its expiry date.  
 
5.3 Sustainability implications of the take-back clause 
agreement between Swedish bread suppliers and retailers 
 
The analysis of retailers’ market power in the context of Swedish bread take-back logistics 
(section 5.2.) has proved that there are certain instances of power abuse on the part of the 
retailers that have a negative impact on suppliers’ profits and might be the cause of small 
overproduction. This section provides a further analysis of potential sustainability breaches 
caused by retailers’ market power abuse, as well as other sustainability implications of take-
back practice through discussion of each sustainability pillar of RSC in question. 
 
5.3.1 Economic pillar of bread reverse logistics 
 
Costs of handling waste and competitiveness 
 
According to Winter and Knemeyer (2013), the economic dimension of sustainability 
presupposes that reverse logistics should ensure company’s long-term success and 
competitiveness. The findings show that reverse logistics is present in all major bread 
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suppliers’ SCs (Interviewees A, B & C, 2014). It is also known that once one company 
introduced it many years ago, all the others followed the trend (Interviewee A, 2014). So, it 
can be inferred that having take-back agreement with the retailers helps companies to stay 
competitive. Yet, it cannot be called a distinctive capability of any of the companies – the 
structure of reverse logistics and activities it involves are very similar for all three bread 
suppliers and do not help them to differentiate. 
 
Rogers et al. (2010) suggests that for the RSC to be sustainable, it should help cutting costs 
and liabilities associated with environmentally undesirable disposal, and should be potentially 
profitable for the supplier. Thus, the costs of recycling the product should not exceed the costs 
of sending it to landfills (Ibid.). It has been found that all three bread suppliers dispose of the 
bread by selling almost all of it to farmers (Interviewees A, B & C, 2014).  Insignificant 
amount from company A’s obsolete bread goes to the NGO, but no bread is sent to waste 
collectors (Interviewee A, 2014). Even though the cost of selling the bread to farmers does 
not cover companies’ production costs, the suppliers still get some revenue on it (Interviewees 
A, B & C, 2014). It was confirmed by store managers that costs of waste containers might be 
quite high when the amount of waste is big (Interviewees 1,2,4 & 6 2014). So, if the bread 
were discarded in a conventional way, i.e. sent to waste collectors, it would only bring quite 
high costs both for suppliers and retailers. Today by feeding pigs, bread suppliers not only cut 
disposal costs but also obtain some revenue on it.  
 
Rogers and Tibben-Lembke (2001) state that if the disposition of products with quickly 
declining residual value is not carried out in a very short time, the remained value of the 
product cannot be put at use to bring the company some profit. In this study processing of 
returned bread is carried out almost immediately (Interviewee B, 2014). Bread suppliers 
usually have yearly contracts with pig farmers, who come and pick up the bread on a regular, 
almost daily basis (Interviewees A, B & C, 2014). Besides, buying the bread is considered a 
profitable business for farmers, so there is always a demand for the obsolete bread and all of it 
is bought – no bread is left to be disposed through other markets (Ibid.). 
 
Rogers and Tibben-Lembke (2001) also mention that the pricing of the taken-back products 
might complicate the reverse logistics, depending on the characteristics of the product and its 
remaining value. The nature of bread, i.e. its quick perishability would most probably 
complicate the possibility to sell it at all, not speaking about the very low value of such a 
product. Yet, all bread suppliers take back the bread in four to two days before its expiry date, 
so the farmers can collect it in a good time before it begins to grow mold (Interviewees A, B 
and C, 2014). The pricing of all the bread is the same, no matter how many days is left until 
expiry or if the product is fresh and simply damaged – all the bread is sold for 1 SEK per kilo 
(Ibid.). Thus, it can be argued that the remained value of the bread can always be put at use to 
bring bread suppliers some revenue, which supports the findings of Rogers and Tibben-
Lembke (2001).    
 
It has been stated by some scholars that arranging for proper recycling might involve further 
investments and changing many of the firms’ processes, which might be overwhelming, so 
companies might decide to save themselves from those troubles, and returned products will 
eventually be turned to landfills (Stock & Mulki, 2009; Rogers & Tibben-Lembke, 2001). 
Swedish bread suppliers appear to have almost no additional processes that might be 
associated with overwhelming costs in their reverse logistics. All three companies do not 
spend money on separating bread from plastic (Interviewees A, B & C, 2014). The farmers 
prepare bread for further use themselves; they even invest in machines that separate plastic 
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packaging from the bread. The only process that might add to their costs is extending the 
duties of the drivers to include forecasting bread demand, managing the shelves and handling 
returned bread (Ibid.). Even though turning their sellers to regular drivers would mean 
decreasing the salaries of personnel, the interviewees B and C admit that doing this would 
mean changing the whole logistics process, which would mean not only extra costs in the 
short-run, but also possible shrinking sales as a result of retailers´ fear to order less 
(Interviewees B & C, 2014). Thus, it can be argued that the current reverse logistics processes 
are not economically sacrificial for the bread suppliers. 
 
Rogers and Tibben-Lembke (2001) state that if the reverse logistics does not allow the 
company to dispose of the returned products in a way that helps minimizing the costs of 
disposal, the investments done (in production, marketing, logistics) risk to fall behind the 
costs. In the case of Swedish bread suppliers one may argue that the costs of disposal are not 
lossmaking for the bread suppliers. The costs of disposal are minimal, and the suppliers even 
obtain some revenue on selling obsolete bread to farmers. Moreover, all three companies 
include a certain percentage of waste in their production calculations, and the waste rate is not 
dramatically higher then the rate that is included, so the practice does not leave the company 
with losses (Interviewees A, B & C, 2014).  
 
Costs from overproduction 
 
Another question of interest in the discussion of economic dimension is whether the existing 
take-back leads to over-production. Findings show that there are only two schemes for 
making the bread orders. When a store has the take-back agreement, bread-suppliers are 
responsible for the whole process (ordering, delivering and taking care of the returns) 
(Interviewees A, B, C & 1-9, 2014). When there is no take-back agreement, the stores make 
orders and dispose of the unsold bread themselves (Interviewees A,B,C, 2,4, 2014).  In case 
the take-back agreement is present, which is true for most of the stores, the whole logistics 
system seems to be tuned and thought-through to ensure as less returns as possible.  
 
First of all, for companies A and B the fixed orders to bakeries two days in advance make it 
possible to have almost no waste at bakeries (Interviewees A & B, 2014). Even though the 
report of company A mentions that it is challenging to adjust the production according to such 
orders, the interviewee A assures that the company manages to keep the waste at production 
level at almost 0% (Interviewee A, 2014; A’s Environmental Report, 2013). Secondly, the 
drivers/sellers are working with the same stores regularly, so their experience and knowledge 
of each store’s needs makes it possible to forecast the demand quite well (Interviewees A, B, 
C, 4, 5 & 8, 2014). Even though there are some insecurities (mostly for drivers of companies 
A and B) that are associated with guessing the order amount two days in advance, the drivers 
are usually able to adjust the ordered quantity to correct the possible faults for each store 
(Interviewees A & B, 2014). For Company C these problems are not so significant – the fact 
that their products are frozen makes it easier to handle them: the ordering times are much 
shorter and the driver can decide what to bring at the day of the delivery without big risks of 
ordering wrong quantities (Interviewee C, 2014).  
 
Moreover, since drivers’ salaries are provision-based, they are very interested in selling more 
and bringing back less (Interviewees A, B & C, 2014). Furthermore, the drivers are 
continuously trained on how to minimize the returns (Interviewees A & B, 2014). They try to 
get hold of historical data and other information that can influence the bread´s sales, discuss 
with retailers the bread campaigns and competitors’ moves (Ibid.).  The company A has even 
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special strategy to decrease the possible returns – it includes a big store as a buffer zone for 
every driver´s district (Interviewee A, 2014).   
 
It was also found that in most cases the stores that make orders themselves end up with much 
higher amounts of unsold bread, compared to leftovers from driver’s orders (Interviewees A, 
B, C, 1, 6 & 8, 2014). Bread suppliers do not allow the stores to order the exact amount they 
want, stores can only order in full carts, which might lead to potentially higher leftovers 
(Interviewees 4 & A, 2014). The higher leftovers might partly depend on the above-
mentioned fact and partly on the inability of the store manager to forecast the demand as good 
as supplier’s sellers (Interviewees A, B, & C, 2014). In any case, both parties – suppliers and 
retailers – claim that they have tested another ordering system, allowing the retailers to make 
the orders. The tests proved that ordering done by stores leads to higher leftovers and 
shrinking sales (Interviewees A, B, C, 1, 6, 7 & 2014). All the above-mentioned facts speak 
for the sophisticated ordering and forecasting practices that help suppliers performing take-
back to deliver the right amount of bread and avoid over-ordering to the best possible extent.  
 
Yet the fact that the bread suppliers are managing the whole process appears to also pose 
some difficulties. When the store has a take-back agreement with suppliers, the retailers are 
not responsible for managing the shelves anymore. Consequently, there is hardly anyone from 
the store staff in the bread department who could advise and give information about the 
campaigns and competitors’ moves. Compounded with the fact that historical data on the 
sales is not always readily available for the driver, this makes it difficult for the sellers, 
especially inexperienced ones, to make optimal decisions about the order and may potentially 
lead to some forecasting faults (Ibid.). 
 
Since sellers are most often the ones who make the decisions about the order’s quantities can 
give them certain power to prevent over-ordering (Interviewees A, B, C, 2, 4, & 5, 2014). 
Moreover, even though the analysis in the previous section confirmed the fact that biggest 
retailers put the most pressure on filling the shelves usually have only around 6% in returns, 
while in smaller stores about 14% is left unsold, which means that their power do not impact 
so much to increased leftovers (Interviewees A & B, 2014). Additionally, the bread suppliers’ 
representatives all mention the fact that in case of conflicts about orders they try their best to 
have a dialogue with the store manager and to either convince him/her to rely on the driver’s 
orders or offer the store to handle the leftovers itself (Interviewees A, B & C, 2014). 
 
However, the companies’ targets for bread returns rate is not met – it is slightly higher than 
the figure included in production calculations (Interviewees A & B, 2014). Findings show that 
this might be the result of some cooperation issues with retailers, as well as driver’s 
inexperience, and even the result of highly variable demand for bread (Interviewees A, B, C 
& 1-8, 2014). The example of Stores 2 and 4 where company B had very different returns rate 
show that the experience of the driver has a direct influence on the amount of leftovers 
(Interviewees 2 & 4, 2014). Thus, the sellers’ ability to forecast is compounded with the 
willingness of store manager to cooperate. For instance, stores 1 and 5 show their readiness to 
join the forces, minimize the waste and use reverse logistics to create value for both parties 
and for the consumer, while stores 6 and 7 are not so willing to pursue any other’s interests, 
but their own (Interviewees 1,5,6 & 7, 2014).  
 
Yet, all representatives of bread companies agree on the fact that the amount of pressure from 
the retailers to keep the shelves full is one of the major factors that prevents bread suppliers to 
keep within the returns rate targets (Interviewees A, B, C, 2014; A’s Environmental Report, 
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2013; C’s Sustainability Report, 2012). This problem is most frequent for some larger retailer 
chains that dictate strict rules on the time the expiring bread should be removed from their 
shelves and thus prevent the bread that is still fresh enough or sometimes completely fresh 
from selling (Interviewees 1 & 6, 2014). Considering this, one can argue that existing take-
back clause under the retailer power abuse leads to a certain amount of over-ordering and 
consequently to unjustified production costs, which negatively impacts economic 
performance of suppliers and increases avoidable waste. 
 
Overall profit maximization  
 
Overall profit maximization with take-back agreement can be further discussed. Seeing that 
suppliers have this agreement with bigger stores, but not all of the suppliers have it with 
smaller stores questions the profitability of the reverse logistics for bread suppliers. The 
analysis of the degree of retailers’ market power in the previous section has shown that 
smaller retailers with lower turnover do not have enough market power to require a supplier 
to arrange for take-back. So, with smaller stores, where the bread suppliers have power to 
negotiate, they choose not to have the reverse logistics. Moreover, company A even allows a 
5% discount to stores that manage waste themselves (Interviewee 2, 2014). This may mean 
that it is more financially beneficial for the company A to lower the prices by 5% than to 
arrange the reverse logistics. If bread suppliers A and C revoke the take-back where they can, 
it may mean it is not overly profitable for them, at least not in smaller stores with lower 
turnovers. 
 
The above conclusions are confronted by the fact that company B has the reverse logistics in 
all the stores it delivers to, even the small ones (Interviewee B & 1-8, 2014). But it can be 
supposed that company B is probably taking advantage of the fact that some other companies 
do not have the take-back agreements in a particular small store and by offering it gets hold of 
the biggest shelf space and better possibilities for selling more products there. That might 
make the reverse logistics in small stores quite profitable for company B.  
 
The fact that all bread companies have been trying to change the agreement also confirms the 
belief that some terms of it prevent them from maximizing profits (Interviewees A, B, 1 & 7, 
2014). Analysis of retailer’ market power in previous section provided several examples of 
such terms, including retailers getting full refund for all bread that has been returned and their 
unwillingness to allow discounts on bread that approaches its expiry dates (Interviewees A, B, 
C & 1-8, 2014). Lack of incentives to cooperate in making these terms more profitable for 
suppliers significantly affect bread suppliers’ economic performance. Sharing the 
responsibility for the costs of returned bread and discounting the bread would allow 
maximizing the profits on sold bread for the suppliers, decrease returns and would potentially 
bring some benefits for the consumers, who could buy the bread for lower prices.  
 
It is believed that introducing reverse logistics might help a company to maximize profits by 
recovering the value of returned products (Winter & Knemeyer, 2013; Presley et al., 2007). 
The discussion of sustainability’s economic dimension in take-back agreement gave good 
grounds to claim that bread suppliers in our case study minimize the costs of discarding the 
bread, yet it is still not possible to argue that with current terms of reverse logistics their 
profits are maximized. There is a much higher potential for profit maximization, and thus, for 
improving the economic dimension of sustainability, if some changes are brought to the terms 
of existing take-back system.  
 
 46 
 
5.3.2 Environmental pillar of bread reverse logistics 
 
The environmental facet of sustainability in RSC implies including mechanisms and networks 
that promote greater environmental responsibility, i.e. implement environmentally sound 
practices such as recycling, remanufacturing and reclamation (Winter & Knemeyer, 2013; 
Rogers et al., 2010). In case of Swedish bread suppliers, the RSCs and take-back agreements 
should minimize the undesirable environmental consequences of landfilling by reusing and 
recycling the waste.  
 
All the three bread suppliers dispose of the returned bread by selling it to pig farmers 
(Interviewees A, B & C, 2014). Almost all the bread that is returned is disposed of in this 
way, and not sent to landfills or incineration, which are the most common ways of disposing 
of biodegradable food waste (Interviewees A, B & C, 2014; Priefer et al., 2013). The small 
amount of bread that is not sold to farmers is donated to NGO, which implies that the bread is 
used for human consumption (Interviewee A, 2014). In this way, the bread does not help 
company to generate any cash, but it still diverts it from landfills. Rogers et al. (2010) 
maintain that the RSC helps to divert the unsold items from landfills through recycling or 
redistributing them to secondary markets. By doing so it reduces the product's ecological 
impact through reducing waste. Implementing environmentally sound practices – selling 
bread to pigs and donating to NGOs diverts it from landfills, and thus minimizes 
environmental impact. 
 
Jack et al. (2010) argue that RSC can bring benefits to the company and environment only if 
the latter has sufficient knowledge about the disposal ways and secondary markets and when 
the capabilities of the firm to perform reverse logistics are adequately weighed. A company 
should be able to dispose of returned products and handle them adequately without the cost 
for environment (Stock & Mulki, 2009; Rogers & Tibben-Lembke, 2001) Bread suppliers in 
this study appear to adjust the reverse logistics practices in a way that finding secondary 
markets and other proper disposal channels for the bread is rather easy, despite of the quick 
perishability of the product (Interviewees A, B & C, 2014). All companies have sufficient 
knowledge about disposal channels, and more than that - these channels are well established 
and secure. The farmers sign yearly contracts with all three companies, so there is no need to 
constantly look for the new disposal channels and be insecure about recycling channels 
(Ibid.). 
 
Thus, the disposal channels and recycling networks used by bread suppliers in Sweden help to 
minimize the undesirable environmental effects of food waste. Instead of being wasted, the 
life of unsold bread is prolonged and the bread serves additional purposes. Finding disposal 
channels is quite easy, and the bread is handled without cost for the environment. In this way, 
the findings of this study coincides with the argument presented by Winter and Knemeyer 
(2013) and Presley et al. (2007), who suggest that a company uses reverse logistics to help 
cutting costs of environmentally undesirable disposal and benefit from recovering the value of 
the returned products, hence making the SC more sustainable.  
 
Yet, current study also provides support findings of Partfitt et al. (2010) and DEFRA (2007), 
pointing that in supplier-retailer interface the efficiency of take-back systems is not 
guaranteed. Regardless of the fact that reverse logistics of Swedish bread suppliers diverts the 
waste from landfills, there are still some instances of market power that (combined with other 
aspects) may lead to increase of avoidable waste in the stores. The lack of the incentive on the 
part of retailers to decrease the rate of bread returns in the presence of take-back agreement 
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was argued to be one of the sources of small overproduction (about 2%) (Interviewees A & B, 
2014). Overproduction, no matter how small it is, might still lead to environmental 
consequences, as it still involves utilizing the resources, and impacting the environment by 
certain production processes to some extent (Eriksson, 2013; Bakas & Herczeg, 2010). These 
environmental costs, no matter how small, would be totally unjustified if the produce would 
finally be left unconsumed and become waste (Priefer, 2013). So, the effects of 
overproduction still negatively affect the environmental pillar of sustainability. 
 
5.3.3 Social pillar of bread reverse logistics 
 
When discussing the social dimension in reverse logistics Presley et al. (2007) argued that 
external population should see greater benefits, and not greater problems as a result of reverse 
logistics activities.  Mena et al. (2011) and Schrettle et al. (2014) argue that measures to 
reduce and manage waste can have a positive effect on life quality of the community as 
whole. Particularly, preventing avoidable food waste is also a question of ethics and morality. 
Discussing the environmental dimension in current analysis, it was demonstrated that bread 
suppliers in Sweden are able to manage the waste in a way that diverts it from landfills 
(Interviewees A, B & C, 2014). Moreover, the companies managed to find a better alternative 
to incineration and landfilling through prolonging the life of unsold bread by directing it to 
human consumption, or animal feed (Ibid.).  Such extended use of an asset and avoiding its 
going to landfills is generally considered to be socially responsible (Rogers et al., 2010; Stock 
& Mulki, 2009).  
 
The improved relations between SC actors are also argued to contribute to the social 
dimension of sustainability on the organizational level by providing benefits to all actors in 
the SC (Ibid.). Jensen et al. (2013) argue that reverse SC is one of the processes that can 
potentially lead to sustainable improvements, as it facilitates the move of the supplier-retailer 
relationship from a more transaction-oriented towards more collaboration-oriented and creates 
good conditions for value-sharing. 
 
The findings from this study, however, show the contrary. The problems of cooperation and 
power struggles are still present in the existing reverse logistics of bread suppliers in Sweden. 
The discussion of economic dimension of take-back practice’s sustainability in current 
analysis shows that there is space for improvements in the cooperation between the retailers 
and bread suppliers, which would help to not only improve the relationships of the suppliers 
and retailers, but will positively impact consumers. It was found that the value of bread that is 
annually sent to farmers only by company B exceeds 100 millions SEK (Interviewee B, 
2014). Enforcing retailers’ incentive to decrease returns might lead to reduced consumer 
prices for bread that reaches its expiry dates, and promote better savings for the companies 
which would provide greater benefits for economy and the society as a whole. Moreover, 
decreasing the existing overproduction that was argued to be partially connected to specific 
terms of take-back agreement between bread suppliers and retailers would decrease both 
economic and environmental impacts and provide increased benefits for the society as a 
whole.  
 
Summary of sustainability implications  
 
In summary (see table 3), the analysis shows that powerful retailers did not impose reverse 
logistics to the bread suppliers, although the spread of take-back agreement was a 
consequence of retailers’ olygopsony power. Bread suppliers have a very good knowledge of, 
and make use of disposal channels that divert the waste from landfills. They have also built 
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the reverse logistics schemes that enable them to avoid high economic and environmental 
costs of handling the waste. That means that in case of Swedish bread suppliers the take-back 
practice does not lead to higher waste caused by inability of suppliers to properly dispose of 
it, which runs counter to the findings Rogers et al. (2010) and Tibben-Lembke (2001).  
 
 
 
It is also clear from the analysis that Swedish bread suppliers performing take-back logistics 
have sophisticated ordering practices, helping to adjust the bread supply to varying demand 
and thus minimize overproduction costs. Moreover, the fact that bread suppliers manage the 
ordering themselves, and have a thought-through system to ensure as less returns as possible, 
leave the retailers little space to exercise their power and to over-order. Thus, the findings do 
not fully confirm the conclusions of previous research arguing that reverse supply logistics 
systems serve as additional incentive for powerful retailers to over-order (Buzby & Hyman, 
2012; Monier et al., 2010; Parfitt et al., 2010; DEFRA, 2007). 
 
However, there are other instances of retailer’s market power within this take-back agreement 
that can still cause over-ordering and other negative effects on the overall sustainability of the 
reverse logistics, and consequently, the sustainability of the whole bread SC. This includes the 
pressure to fill the shelves, the terms that oblige bread suppliers to refund retailers for the 
unsold bread and unwillingness of retailers to discount the expiring bread. These instances of 
retailers’ market power manifestation have not been discussed in detail by previous research.  
Yet, this market power effects may lead to significant sustainability breaches, including 
increased returns. The findings of current research also suggest that introducing the economic 
incentive for the retailers to decrease the amount of returned bread might cut the amount of 
returns, and hence reduce avoidable waste. 
Table 3:Sustainability implications of take back agreement in Swedish 
bread industry [own creation] 
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6 Conclusions 
 
The aim of this work was to explore and the tack-back practice between Swedish bread 
suppliers and retailers; describe how it is carried out, and more specifically, how this 
particular agreement and possible power asymmetries between suppliers and retailers may 
impact the overall sustainability of the supply chain.  
 
The findings led to conclusion that retailer chains in the Swedish industry have many sources 
of market power to exert influence on bread suppliers. A combination of certain market power 
sources, i.e. retailers’ ability to choose suppliers offering the best deals and the fact that 
retailer industry is highly concentrated, has led to a rapid spread of take-back agreement. This 
has gradually changed the general market practices in the whole industry, altering supply 
chain of bread and bread suppliers’ services.  
 
The analysis of take-back clause implications on sustainability of bread supply chain has not 
fully confirmed the arguments of previous research, claiming that reverse supply logistics 
systems serve as additional incentive for powerful retailers to over-order (Buzby & Hyman, 
2012; Monier et al., 2010; Parfitt et al., 2010; DEFRA, 2007). It is mainly disproved because 
in Swedish bread industry it is the suppliers (and not retailers) who are responsible for 
ordering. Although the spread of take-back agreement was a consequence of retailers’ 
olygopsony power, swedish bread suppliers, performing take-back logistics, have 
sophisticated ordering and forecasting practices that help to deliver the right amount of bread, 
and partly suppress the possible instances of market power (Interviewees A, B & C, 2014). 
Yet, the fact that bread suppliers’ targets for bread returns rate is slightly higher than the 
figure included in production calculations might be the compound result of bread sellers’ 
forecasting faults and other forms of retailers’ market power exercise.  
 
When assessing the economic dimension of take-back practice in the context of Swedish 
bread suppliers, it can be argued that there is a much higher potential for suppliers’ profit 
maximization. It was found that one reason for that might be retailers’ abuse of market power 
through imposing some terms of the take-back practice that prevent suppliers from realizing 
full economic potential. The market power is manifested in lack of economic incentive on the 
part of retailers to decrease the amount of unsold bread and lack of cooperation between some 
store managers and suppliers’ sellers, which may lead to higher amount of bread returns. The 
above confirms that in the context of perishable products, such as bread, the take-back 
agreements in the retailer-supplier interface may be the cause of some overproduction. 
 
Overproduction, no matter how small it is, might lead to environmental consequences, as it 
still involves utilizing the resources, and impacts the environment by production processes 
(Eriksson, 2013; Bakas & Herczeg, 2010). Even small environmental costs are totally 
unjustified as the bread is finally left unconsumed and becomes waste (Priefer, 2013). Thus, 
even though it was found that RSC and take-back agreements in case of Swedish bread 
suppliers are organized in a way that minimize the undesirable environmental consequences 
of landfilling and incineration, the environmental pillar of sustainability is still negatively 
affected by the effects of overproduction.  
 
The discussion of take-back practice’s implications on SC’s sustainability in current analysis 
shows that there is also space for improvements in cooperation between the retailers and 
bread suppliers, which would help to not only improve their business relationships, but will 
positively impact consumers. Moreover, decreasing overproduction, that appeared to be 
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partially connected to specific terms of take-back agreement, would decrease both economic 
and environmental costs, and thus provide more benefits for the society as a whole.  
 
To sum up, take-back practices of Swedish bread suppliers in the supplier-retailer interface 
have certain negative effects due to existing power asymmetries. There is a potential for 
improvement across all SC’s sustainability pillars if the problems caused of these power 
asymmetries are addressed. The sustainability breaches are mainly connected with specific 
terms of the take-back agreement with retailers that may become the source of 
overproduction, and thus lead to economic, environmental and social costs.  
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Epilogue 
 
During the interviews both with retailers and bread suppliers a serious concern has been 
repetitively mentioned. It is the persistent consumer pressure on retailers to fill up the shelves 
with all possible sorts of bread. This, as mentioned before, may lead to over-production hence 
to excessive food waste (Interviewees 1, 5, 6, 7  & A, 2014). When discussing the problem of 
empty shelves vs. full shelves, some retailers and suppliers believe that a consumer expects 
that the shelves in the evening will look exactly as in the mornings (Ibid.). As put by the 
manager of Store 5, “consumers do not accept when they do not find fresh bread every day at 
any time” (Interviewee 5, 2014). Store 7 (2014), for instance, always makes sure that the 
customers are satisfied. He states, ”… if a consumer comes two days in a row and does not 
find the bread he/she is looking for, the person will not come back again. That is why we try 
to make sure that our customer always finds what he/she needs”. Store 1 also emphasizes that 
its ultimate goal is to satisfy consumers’ needs. Therefore, it tries to make sure that no bread 
with approaching expiry dates is left on the shelves (Interviewee 1, 2014). Finally, store 
manager 6 mentions that consumers are often too demanding and states, “The problem is that 
people always want the best expiry dates on the products they buy. It goes for every product. 
They don’t care if the product expiring one day earlier might be of the same quality, and 
always pick the one with the longest expiry date” (Interviewee 6, 2014). 
 
Interviewee A explains that in the end it is the consumer who puts pressure on retailer by 
expecting to find whatever he/she is looking for at 9 in the evening. The retailers in turn put 
pressure on bread suppliers. He believes that the key problem is that consumers got used to 
finding all kinds of products at any time of the day. He says, “ they (consumers) see no 
difference between ketchup and bread”. Interviewee A is convinced that bread suppliers and 
the retailers should explain to consumers that the bakery business is a “fresh” business and 
that the fresh bread arrives in the morning and one cannot expect to find all sorts of fresh 
bread at 9 o’clock in the evening. So in order to minimize the waste bread suppliers and 
retailers need to educate the consumers. They should learn to accept that fresh products can be 
out of stock by the end of the day and that the retailers and suppliers have the burden of 
managing the waste (Interviewee A, 2014).  
 
These concerns should speak for the importance of raising consumer awareness about the 
need to reconsider their buying behavior. This is true for bread and for other perishable 
products as well. Happily, a recent study from YouGov (2013) showed that consumers’ 
awareness of food waste issue is growing and that 6 out of 10 Swedes now are ready to accept 
less stocked bread shelves in the supermarkets if it would benefit the environment (A´ 
Sustainability Report, 2013). The ways of raising consumers’ awareness about the problem of 
avoidable waste might serve as a good topic for further research on food waste.  
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Appendix 1: The major brands and corporate 
ownerships in Swedish retail market 
 
 
 
 
Source (Eriksson, 2012, p.16) 
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Appendix 2: Questions to bread suppliers 
 
Market Power 
 
Can you describe how take-back agreement works in you company? 
How has the take-back clause developed?  
Why do you have take-back agreement? 
Since when do you have it?  
Has this agreement always been present between you and retailers?  
Who initiated the take-back clause practice (retailer or your company)?  
Do the terms of take-back clause vary from store to store?  
Who do you negotiate with (with headquarters or with each individual store)?  
What kinds of contracts do you have and why do they vary?   
As I know you have take-back agreement with Coop and ICA stores. Do you have this 
agreement with the all stores in Coop and Ica chains (ICA nära, maxi, kavntum etc., and 
Coop, forum, extra, nära etc.)? 
Do you have this agreement with all the retailers you supply bread to? 
When do you have to take-back the bread?  
Are these rules the same for all retailers? 
Do retailers get refund for unsold bread? full or partial? 
Are there any points of disagreement that sometimes arise between you and retailer, 
specifically regarding the take-back system? 
What do you think, how would the situation look like if you did not have the take-back 
clause?  
Do you see any better alternative ways of contracting with the retailers? 
 
Economic 
 
Who is responsible for forecasting and ordering? 
What are the ordering routines?  
How do you decide on the amount of bread supplied? 
How much bread is usually returned?  
How hard is it to dispose of returned products? 
Do you think that the fact that you take care of the disposal adds value to your company?  
How does the take-back policy influence your production (overproduction) and overall waste 
at your bakeries?    
Does the process of taking back the bread require you to take additional actions and 
investments? (additional labor hours, extra transportation, extra keeping space, extra time 
resources, etc.)  
 
What percent of value are you able to recover when you sell the bread to farmers? 
Do you have any contractual agreement with farmers on the amount of bread they are ready to 
buy?  
Are the farmers always capable of buying the full amount of bread that is left unsold? If not, 
what happens to the bread that farmers refuse to buy?  
What are the costs of handling it then? 
 
Environmental 
 
What happens to the bread that has been taken back? 
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Do you have individual food waste reduction targets?  
Have you already reached any targets that you have set?  
Do you cooperate with retailers in order to reduce waste? 
What are the advantages or disadvantages of waste handling, namely selling the bread to 
farmers in your company, today? 
 
Social 
 
Is there any legislation/regulation that obliges you to take care of the product throughout the 
whole life cycle, which encouraged the take-back provision?   
Do you have any sustainability or CSR programs?  
Does it include food waste management?  
Do you have any environmental certification/labeling (miljömärkning) for your products or 
store? If yes do certification criteria include management of food waste? 
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Appendix 3: Questions to retailers 
 
Market Power 
 
Can you describe the ordering process of fresh bread from suppliers namely how suppliers 
take back the unsold/expired bread and fill the shelves with fresh bread?  
How often do you require a supplier to replenish the shelves? 
How important is for your store to have full stocked shelves?  
Do you require from bread suppliers to fill up the shelves fully? 
When suppliers have to take back the left/unsold bread? (Exact days before the expiry date)  
Do all bread suppliers have to take back bread the same days before expiry date? 
All sorts of bread is taken back or returned to the bread supplier? 
 
Who negotiates contract terms with bread suppliers (the headquarters or the each individual 
store)? 
Do you know why and how this provision (take-back clause) has been developed?  
Is it your initiative or the suppliers’? 
Since when do you have this provision in the contracts?  
Do you have this kind of agreement with all of your bread suppliers at all stores in your 
chain? 
Do you see any better alternative ways of contracting than the current practice? 
Does the supplier refund the amount of money for the bread that is left unsold? 
Do you encounter any conflicts with suppliers regarding the take-back process?  
Does take-back activity add value to your company?  
Do you benefit from this activity and how? 
Is it costly to manage the unsold bread? 
 
Environmental 
 
What happens to the leftovers of your own-produced bread and bread that has no take-back 
agreement?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
